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PHEFACE 
Father Valdivia, a jesuit well known in the land of Chile, has been 
rather completely ignored by English-wri tiIijS' .. l1istorians and has been given 
indeed but cursory notice by the Spanish authorities. Nevertheless the 
story of his trial and endeavor deserves more th8.n passing mention. His 
struggles on behalf of the frun.ed Araucanians tndicate the vi tal political, 
soci8.1, economic, and militqry problems that gnawed at Chile throughout col-
onial times. Valdivia and those who opposed him fought over issues of a 
highly imuortant nature and they inaugurated.'a debate which lA.sted for almos 
two centuries after their death. Writers who have not ignored the'activitie 
of the padre, have described them in many cases in 'fords dramatic but vague, 
stating their personal approval or disapproval of Valdivia while failing to 
indicate specifically just what his work WqS. Therefore, in v~iting this 
paper three questions have been borne in mind. \Vhat was the padre trying~o 
do? What did he do1 Why did he not achieve his goal? 
Despite the element of human interest contained in them, facts not 
bearing upon the answers of these questions have been conscientiously 
omitted. I consider it quite sufficient to supply the facts, recognizing 
that the reader will arrive at his own conclusions without the annoyance of 
dissenting or agreeing with personal comments. 
This thesiS is not a biographical sketch. It deals with only twenty 
of the eighty-one years of Padre Valdivia's life. Merely tracing the travel 
of the padre would provide material for a difficult cartogr<:"phlcal investi-
I 
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gation in itself, a study thus far unattem?ted. The results of my work 
.. .. ; 
presented in this paper are the initial findings of an investigation which 
I intend to continue. 
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CHAPTER I 
~ -TO 'YrlE BIO-BIO 
Previous to the fifteenth century np'~ocumentary evidence divulging 
the history of Chile has been discovered. The Peruvian recordings of an 
expedition made by Inca Yupangui who sent soldiers to subject the Chileans 
• 1 
are the first upon which historical facts of Chile may be based. Little 
force was necessary nominally to subjugate the natives as far south as the 
Rapel river, which formed thereafter the southern boundary of the lncan 
empire. 
South of these less rancorous aborigines, below the Bfo-Bfo, dwelled 
another species of the race - the Araucanian. These fleet, though flat 
footed fellows, 1A1ith beading eyes set w'i thin circular faces, lived to com-
fortably ripe old ages, retaining their faculties and teeth aL~ost to thei 
2 
last breath. Their patriotism, or perhaps mere sense of justice, thei~ 
courHge, and their ability to undergo the most rigorous of ordeals, portra. 
them as noble Indians; such a portrait becomes less attractive when their 
capacity for excessive cruelty, their superstition, and their intemperate 
imbibing in alcoholic beverages are noted. Esp8cially during times of war 
were these latter traits brought to the foreground, further arming them 
1 Juan Ignacio Holina, S.J., tr. by William Haley and H. Boyd, .:rb&Geo-
graphiclj.l, Natural and CivillHistory..Q.t Chile, London, 1808, II, 9-10; 
~as Guevara, Historia de Chile: Chile Prehispanp, Santiago, 1925, 
I, 113-143. 
2 ~, Ii II 54-55. For a detailed sectional study of these natives see J';O na, , 
Guevara, I, 191-261. 
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wi th the povier of inpenetrable resistance. 
Li ving in their rucas or reed tents, sleeping upon piles of straw wit 
.... .., 
tree trunks for their pillows, dining upon partially boiled meat or occasion 
ally fish, and ahT"l.ys upon the plentiful herbs of Chilean soil, drinking 
fruit juices, both fresh and. fermented, they lived in a free unhampered 
style, until they were regimented in military formation when necessity so 
demanded. 
Although they were ignorant of writing, they had developed an exceptio -
ally individual vocabulary and gr~E~tical construction indicating little 
3 
influence of the northern Chilean language. The creative ability they 
posse0sed found expression in their un\~itten chants to which their melodic 
4 
tongue adipted itself beautifully. These barbarians had developed a rudi-
mentary method of calculation satisfactory for their simple needs. They u-d 
developeo past the huntsmen stage and may be classified as 8csricultnral by 
5 
the time the Spaniards had arrived. 
Slight or nonexistant was their tendency to congregate in urban fash- I 
ion; they grouped togethp.r chlefly as patriarchal units which settled in 
secluded sections TfThere they could awell '1ccording to their ovm desi.gns. 
Grooms purchased their brides from the fathers; the possible number of 
-----=.'-.• ~--------------------~------------------------------------3 Molina, II, 5-7; Guevara, II, 94-100. 
4 Guevara, II, 365-374. 
5 They had a system of irrigation and they used metal implements for farming 
.I.l2.1.1.., I I , ;:. 8 7 • 
6 ~., 313-343. 
.' 
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6 
brides per groom depended solely upon the groom's purehasing power. The 
women, in the same social category as househQ1d equipment, did all the 
.. 4; 
menial tasks while the men mastered ~uch arts as hunting, hockey, and hand-
ball to sharpen further their natural agility. 
Only when the exigencies of the time so 4demanded W8"J there a semb1ence 
of national unity among the Araucanians. In such critical times several 
tribes would feder9te under the leadership of elected chiefs, called toquis, 
who were to remain in command for the duration of hostilities. Since peace 
became almost an unknown Quantity after the Spaniards set foot on Chilean 
soil, these military divisions asstmled political orgqnization with four 
7 
primary divisions or uthalmapus from north to south. Little tribute was 
required of the Araucanian other than his mIlitary service. Simple was the 
8 
life of the Araucanian - proportianate1y simple his economic needs. .~ 
Po1ythei~tic, they rendered special accord to two gods - the good god 
Pi11an who dwelt somewhere in the clouds, and the evil god Guecubu whom they 
9 
held accountable for the majority of their tribulations. Adorned with 
countless mythical beasts and serpents, their religion took on the aspect 
I 
of many of the credos of such primitive tribes, though it was less sacrifici 1 
7 Molina, II, 60. These divisions were: 1) Lauquenmapu, or the maritime 
country, 2) Lebunmapu, or the plain country, 3) Inapire-mapu, or the foot 
hill country, and 4) Pirem9.pu, the land of the Andes. 
6 lhld., II, 21. The gold, silver, copper, tin, and lead the Indians ex-
tracted were not used for mecl i wn of exchange. 
9 Cresente Errazuriz, O.P., ~ Orijenes ~ 1a Iglesia Chilena, SaBtiago, 
1873. Henceforth to be cited as ~ Orijenes. Guevara, I, 393-459. 
.' 
- 4 -
10 
in character. While they held to some form of existence after death 
should claim their mort'1l garb, their's was not the conviction that life 
was in any way preparatory for death. 
The first Spanish entrada into the nresent Chile was made by Ama1gro 
who wi thin the ye8_rs 1535 to 1537 managed to :;istreat an astonishingly large 
nmnber of natives, both those with whom he C'UIle in contlict and those whom 
11 
he had brought from Peru as yanacanas. Heedless of the admonitions of 
those ecclesia8tics who accomnanieo him, he blotted the nRm8 of SrJaniard 
12 
with bloody connotations. 
Regardless of the reported lack of ready wealth in the new territory, 
Pizarro's quartermaster Pedro de Valdivia, with 100 to 200 Spaniards reen-
forced by Indian auxiliaries of Peru, turned southward to the Chilean land. 
Departing from the plaza of Cuzco ~anuary 20, 1540, Pedro and comnany tra-,..... 
veIled for seven months over the rougftt route ~,algro had traversed on his 
return trip to Peru. Arriving at the fertile valley of Copiapo he harvested 
the animosity Amalgro had sown. In February of the following year the re-
sourceful Valdtvia foundeC! the capital of Santiago where he org~ntzefl a 
cabildo the following mJrnth; to return the complimfmt the cabildo elected 
10 The native "priests" were more like policemen.than spiritUal guides. 
11 By 1533, when Pizarro had completed his con'luest of the Incas, disputes 
had risen over thedi vision of the spils. Meanwhile Ar1algro "t'lent 1Joutht t 
investigate rmnors of weAlth. With 600 Spaniards and 15,000 nattves he 
began his expedition; 150 Spaniards and 10,000 natives died. Molina,II, 
29-31-
A2Accompanying Amalgro were the kercedarians Antonio Rondon and Francisco 
Ruiz and the secular priest Cristobal de frolina. Errazuriz, 1.2§. Origines, 
46-47. 
I 
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him governor of Chile. SAntiago was soon to undergo the ravages of demoli-
tion and reconstruction - the cycle so often repeated by the cities and forts 
of C~ile. 
In 1543 when the "Men of C~ile" violently ushered Pizarro out of the 
world of mortals, Pedro de ValdiVia felt comnletely freed from subservience 
to anyone in Peru, holding himself accountable·onlY to the authorities in 
Spain. The following year he travelled south to the Bfo-Bfo where he came 
in contact with the Araucanians, engaging in a brief but undecisive scrape. 
Overcoming the obstacles of insufficient supplies, delays, mutinous soldiers 
and natives, he might be said to have pacified northern Chile by 1549; thus 
13 
the conquistador moved southward to found Concepcion on October 5, 1550. 
The natives of the vicinity looked for assistance from their Araucanian 
neighbors, who h'3.d given Valdivia a more bitter taste of their mac ana in an 
attack made shortly before the founding of Imperial on the Coutfn river, a~ 
of Va~via on its present site. Valdivia founded six towns; the seventh was 
to be in the center of Araucania, Los Confines or Angol. With the forts of 
Arauco along the coast, Tucapel on the western slope of the cordillera, and 
14 
Pu1!8B. east of the same Nahuelbuta, security seemed assured. But the 
Spaniards had neg1ecte; to take into account the "no trespassint atti tude of 
<t' 
the Araucanians. 
13 Pedro d~ Cordoba y Figueroa, Historia de Cbi1e, Diego Barros Arana, ed., 
Coleccion de Historiadores de Chile. ¥... Documentos Relaj:.ivos ~ 1a Historia 
Nacional, Santiago, 1881-1923, II, 33-36. Hereafter the collection will 
be cited as Coleccion Historiadores. 
14 fTCartas de Pedro de Valdiivia al Emnerador Carlos V", Coleccion Histori-
adores, I. 
I 
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During 1550 the toqui Aillaralu, with 4000 followers, crossed the Bfo-
Bfo to challenge the Spaniards on the banks of the Andalian where Valdivia 
15 
experienced painful astonishment at their cqu~age and their military ability • 
.. "7 16 
A year later the Araucaniansmade a second attack upon the SpaniardS. 
While Pedro de Valdivia was busily dotting the territory with the seven 
cities and three forts, a youthful fugitive ya*a~~, formerly a favorite of 
the Spanish governor, escaped to the Araucanian land where he further roused 
the inhabitants by orations UDon the nobilit.y of defending their own land and 
17 
rights. In absolute accord with the unto death resistance fostered by the 
you~h were Caupolican and other Arr:mcanian tOlluis. Informed of the I'lnnoY8nC'8 
inflicted by 8aupolican, Pedro de Valdi Vi8 denprten from Conce-pcion to nunish 
such 8ud2city. Valdivia arrived at Tucapel on Christmas day, 1553, only to 
view the ruins of the fort he had erected. Nor had the natives ceased their 
ectivity. They fell upon the Spaniards with 811 their savage instincts weH 
in the foreground. Such was the frenzy to which the Spanish intrusion had 
aroused the Araucanian that before life flowed from the governor, they were 
18 
consuming his flesh. 
~---~-'-,--------- ,_._------,-,------------15 MOlina, II, 129-130. 
16 Ibid., II, 133. 
17 Annnlategui, Descubrimiento, 322. 
18 Ibid., 333-334. While not cannabilistic according to taste ( they -pre-
ferred a herbaceous diet) they develoned an appetite for fresh killed 
Spaniards as the war proceeded. Diego Barros Arana, Hi:'3toria J"ener81 de 
Chile, Santiago, 1884-190~, I, 432-437. Hereafter this latter work witH 
be cited as Ristoria. 
I 
.' 
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In less than twenty years the region of Chile had been subdued north of 
the Bfo-Bfo. The warfare south of the river VI?,S to continue for over 200 
years. 
Spain WB.S at the peak of her power. Although Felipe II (1556-1598) 
waged wars with his European neighbors, he had est"lblished notable prestige. 
His colonies had grown. Under his reign giant4strides in colonial organiza-
tion were mAde. In Chile, however, the conquistador had not only opened the 
door for the Spani ards, but remained wi thin the Portals, dominating the civil 
and political institutions. r,lili tarism was the keynote of Chile. Militarism 
continued to predominate even through republican times. 
Francisco Vill~grA, unsuccessful in his pursuit of the Indian Lautaro 
who had rousec1 the natives to the slaying of Valdivia, was forced to forsake 
hope of speecy vindication. Insistant that someone suffer for the atrOCity, 
Villagra ravaged the countryside of Imnerial, under the guise of the right~ 
of war. The small pox germs were more effective than the supe~ior Spanish 
19 
weanons and armor in subduing the natives. The cities of Vald.ivia., Villa-
rica, Imperial, Angol and Concepcion looked to Francisco Villagra for pro- I 
20 
tection he was able to supply. The inhabitants of Angol and Villarica were 
forced to retreat to Imperial or Concepcion. Villagr~ fortified with cavalry 
infantry, armades, arquebuses, and six canons marched for two days through 
19 1fulina, II, 159; Cresente Errazuriz, Historia de Chile sin Gobernador 
1554-1563, Santiago, 1912. 
20 Amunategui, Descubrimiento, 343. 
- 8 - .' 
the land past the B[o-B(o, sighting no sign of "lcti vi ty. Then from the hill 
of M"ariguenu a troop of Araucanians rained down under the leadership of Lau-
tara. For five hours the battle continued; ~ot even the death-dealing can-
nons deterred these sons of Chile. Never was Francisco Villagra to erase 
from his memory the display of Araucanian physical as ~ell as psychological 
21 
strunina he witnessed in his bitter defeat. 
22 
~onsternation plagued Concepci 
on; the city was depopulated. Nor was his success in reestavlishing the 
city substantial, for Lautaro again effected its ruination. Ardently the 
audacious Araucania.ns planned to wipe out the cities of Imperial and Santia.g 
simultaneously. For two days the battle raged near Santiago; until a missle 
of death extinguished the stormy Lautaro successful resistance ?ms not at 
23 
all assured the Spaniard •• 
The following April, 1557, Don Garcia de Mendoza arrived with mili taIrY 
supplies and new hope for the Spaniards. Erecting the city of Canete upon,... 
the site of the demolished Tucapel where Pedro de Valdivia had been slain, 
p@pulating the cities of Concepcion and Villarica, engaging in nunerous 
skirmishes, Don Garcia had established control more definitely to the Bfo-
24 
Bio. When, 1559, he left Chile to succeed his father as Viceroy of Peru, 
21 Ibid., 349-350. 
22 ~., 360~ Errazuriz, Historia de Chile sin GovernQdor, 63-87. 
23 Errazuriz, Historia de Chile sinGobernador, 418-428. 
24 Not only did Don Garcia rebuild Concepcion and Angol, but he built the 
cities of Canete in TUcapel, Osorno in Chaurcovi, and San Juan de la 
Frontera in Cuyo. He reestablished the forts of Arauco and Tucapel. 
Amunategui, Descubrimtento, 494-501. 
I 
.' 
- 9 -
Don Garcia's governorship was delegated to the veteran Franc:tlsco de Villagr~ 
whosesfailures to squelch the uprisings in Tucapel and Arauco, and whose di6-
grace in depopulating Canete and the fort of -'~.rauco were by no means effaced 
25 ;;. .• ., 
by his successor Pedro de Vil18gra. No strikingly pem.anent advances were 
made by Don Melchor Bravo de Aravia Sotomayor whose encounters with the 
rugged race led to a repeated depopulation of ~nete which had been reesta-
blished six leagues from its original site by governor interno Rodrigo de 
Q,uiroga, Lebu, whi ch had been establi shed also by (.~ui roga, and to retiremen t 
26 
from the fort of Arauco which had been rebuilt. Followed by Rodrigo de 
Quiroga, this time as actual govennDr, Sotomayor's defeats were scarcely 
27 
balanced. An appreciable amount of peace propaganda was dispersed during 
the governorship of Don Martin Rui z de Ga"l1boa, ,mo, neJ'ertheless, continued 
to suffer military defeats. The comparative moderation of Gamboa found 
striking contrast in the renewed merciless castigation under Don Alonso So~-
28 
mayor. Despite his attacks throughout Puren, Ilicura and Tucapel, he was 
forced to retire to the Bio-B{o, having gained nothing but the increased 
hatred of the Araucanians who soon forced the evacuation of the forts of Pure , 
Trinindad, and Spiritu Santo. The governor's defeat in the battle of Marigua 
25 Diego de Rosales,S.J., Bistoria General del Reino de Chile, Valparajso, 
1878, II, 106-123. 
26 ~., II, 192-196. 
27 Cordoba y Figueroa, Historia, Coleccion Historiadores, II, 132-135. 
28 Rosales, II, 206-211. 
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no and the repeat performance on the hill of Villagra bespeak the reaction 
29 
of the natives. 
While ~ot.omayor Vias in Peru req.uesting reenforcements, he met his soon 
1- 4'" 
to be successor, the nephew of St. Ignatius, Don Martin Garcia Ofiez de Loyola 
While Governor Loyola was less harsh than his predecessor, he still continued 
30 
the way of the sword. 
Ohile was no pot of gold, but rather a file of debts. It had been an 
economic disappointment from the time Amalgro returned with no evidence of 
loot or tales of a'::Jounding opportunity. The land itself VlaS rich, but it re-
quired working. The natives were most unobliging, possessing no traditional 
treasure houses which could be pilfered. The continual warfare was a great 
financial drain upon the so called treasury of Chile; since the treasury 
amounted to nothing more than an accumulation of expenses, the king was dis-
tracted by the situation. His solution was to order the Treasury of Peru ~ 
Potosi to aSSUJ\'!e the financial burden of Chile. Delays in the reco!llpensing 
of the soldiers and even the lesser officials did little to heighten the 
morale or efficiency of the Spaniards. Continual reCluests for more supplies I 
in order to pursue the war added immeasurably to the high price of Chile. 
31 
Commerce which might have been profitable was rendered almost impossible. 
29 ..!B.!£., II, 220-227. 
30 Rosp-les, II, 260-263. 
31 Commercial pursuits would have been extremely cumbersome even without the 
eXisting iniernal impediments, for according to the prescribed trade route~ 
of the Spanish fleet system all goods would have to pass through Portobelo. 
The expense of ship~ent was enormous. Similarly multiplied in cost was 
European goods by the time it would arrive in Chile. 
~. 
----------------------------------------------------~ 
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Only those who indulge::' in the exploitation of the native through personal 
service found pecuniary compensation. 
For the Chilean native "Spaniard" speJJep drudgery and bondage. Amalgro 
• 47 
had r8.ised the Indians to a peak of hostility; Pedro de Valdivia mouhted the 
peak. Following the con~luistador "Derogative of alloting to those who had 
serveo him well large tracts of land with repa1timiet;ttos of natives who were 
to be held in encomienda, Valdivia had distributed the Indians and their land 
32 
with generous abandon. According to the theory of the encomienda system, 
the owner of the haciendas has the right to require the personal service of 
the native in return for which he should supply his temporal a.nd spiritual 
necessi ti es. As the system operated in Chile the phrase ·'personal servi ce" 
W'iS just an euphemistic designation of slavery. Wi th no remuneration the 
Indians wwere forced to labor in the~ines, work in the fields, leave their 
f8Jllilies frequently, being assured of severe cnstip.:Rti.on should they fail t.. 
discharge their "duties." 
The rabid Father Las Casis had instigated the famous New L8ws which be-
came legally effective in 1542, stipulating the cession of heredit8ry encomi- I 
!'maas derranding tha§ all the repBrtimientos UI'lSS to the hq,nds of the king. 
Grossly eX2gerating the condition of the native in all colonial Amertca, th 
though his personal experience was extremely limited, Father Las Casas 
serve) only to create a legend odr cruelty which other nations attributed to 
32 Domingo Amun6tegui y Solar, ~ Encomiendas ~ Indljen9 s ~ Chile, 
Santiago, 1909, II, 3-140. Hereafter cited as Encomiendas. 
-12-
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spaniards. The Viceroy of Peru, Blasco Nunez Vela, who arrived at Tumbez 
in the March of 1544 gave no serious consideration to these laws which were 
given similar treatment throughout Spanish America. 
The warfare in Chile was not conducive.t-o the persuading of military 
.,. 47 
men to treating with leniency the natives whom they were rivalling in 
savagry. Nor did the institution of personal service, most despised by the 
natives, incline them to sentiments of peaoe ~th men who interpreted peaoe 
as their own comfort aided and abetted by the slavery of the natives. 
Don Garcia de Mendoza had shown a spark of concern over the plight of 
the natives. Immediately the oidor, Santillan, fanning the spark, proposed 
a plan whereby but one-sixth of the natives be obliged to labor; he proposed 
that the toquis select those who should be included in the one-sixth.33 For 
less strenuous service the largest proportion of the natives to be engaged 
in such tribute should be one fifth. There was to be no overburdening of 
the natives by the encomenderos, but the Indian was to be accorded the 
necessities whioh he rightfully deserved aocording to thp theory of the en-
i 
comendero plan. Since this system, by limiting the number of slaves would 
reduce the profit of the encamendero, while it would abolish the trade of 
enslaved captives so lucrative to the soldier, it resolved itself into 
nothin but words. 
The next interim of attempted mercy, or justioe, ooourred during the 
33Jose Toribio Medina, ed., Coleocion de dooumentos ineditos Para la 
historia de Chile desde el Via"je de Mi"gallanes basta la batilla de Maipo, 
Santiago Ole Chile, 188-1~2, XXVI~, 284-302. Hereart~ to be cite& as 
Medina, Coleocion. 
I 
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office of Martfn RU!z de Gamboa, governor interno, When in 1580 he vainly 
attempted pecuniary sUbstitution for personal service.34 Again neither 
were the Indians who paid no tribute during times of peace to their own 
toquis willing to cooperate nor would the Sp~sh unconscientious objectors 
- the soldiers and the encomenderos - agree to any alteration which would 
reduce their profits. 
The Dominican Fray Gil Gonzalez de San Nitolas and the Bishops Fray 
Antonio de San Miguel and Fray Diego de Medellin, contrary to their fellow 
Spaniards, had expressed the sentiment that Christian treatment be meted to 
the natives. 
Fray Gil Gonzalez de San Nicolas attempted to restrain the severity of 
Pedro de Villagra and of QUiroga by vociferous preaching against such mal-
treatment. He offered no plan, nor did he present any skeleton of coherent 
constructive solution, but confined himself largely to denunciations of the 
Spanish tactics with a zeal that too frequently savored of the frantic. 35 .~ 
The first bishop of Imperial, Fray San Miguel, viewed with horror the 
physical and spiritual degradation that the war had wrought upon the land and 
people. Numerous were his efforts to alleviate the pitiable condition of the I 
natives on the haciendas of Imperial. Still he too negleoted to present any 
34Domingo AmuDitegui y Solar, Historia $ocial de Chile, Santiago, 1932. 
30-34; Errazuriz, Los Orijenes, 339-341. --
35The friar declared~at anyone guilty of slaying an Indian would be damned 
to hell. His eloquence carried him further into deolaring that should the 
soldier not possess a clear conscienoe when told to fight the Indians, he 
/ 
was under no obligation to comply with such a command. Errazuriz, Pedro 
~ Villagra, Santiago, 1916, 229-345; Errazuriz, ~ Orijenes, 150. 
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f .' plan for eradicating the~ plight, but rather di.played a holy zeal in 
assisting the natives who were ill and suffering, and by personally appealing 
to the various encomendero. to deal more justly with these Indians. 36 
A later bishop of IMperial, Fray Don Die£o de Medellin frequently dis-
.. 'ii, 
patohed letters of complaint to the king protesting against the wrongs in-
flioted upon the natives. 37 The sole evidence of the influenoe of Fray 
Medellin is in the personal induoements he efftoted upon certain enoomenderos 
to provide hospitilization for those natives Who needed care. 3a Laudable as 
are the efforts of the bishop, they too were merely attempts to alleviate 
the suffering instead or endeavors to cut the oore of tribulation away. 
The ten eoolesiastios whom Pedro de Valdivia brought to Chile included 
three seoular priests and seven Meroedarians; these fathers were occupied in 
providing the Spaniards, prinoipally the soldiers. with spiritual guidance 
though oocasionally they attempted to help the natives wi thin the oity or 
Santiago. 39 Great was the need for eoolesiastios in Chile. On September 1\ 
a royal oedula oharged the Dominican provincial of Peru, Fray Domingo de 
Santo Tomas, with the duty or dispatohing priests to Chile.40 In compliance 
3~rrazuriz, Los Orijenes 221-226. 
37 -Ibid., 225. 
38ibId •• 226, 255-265. 
39The seoular ecolesiastios were the Fathers Rodrigo Gonzalez. Diego Perez, 
and Juan Lobo; the seven Meroedarians were the frays Antonio Rondon; 
Antonio Correa. Bernabe Rodriguez, Juan de Zamora. Antonio de Olmedo. 
Diego Jaime (saoerdote) and the brother Martin Velazquez. Ibid., 50. 
4OIbid., 97-96. ----
I 
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.' 
with the oedu1a Gil Gonzalez de San Nioolas had been sent to Chile with the 
ti tIe of vioario ~ .oiOn, acoompanied by Fray Luis de Ch8.vez and another 
religious Whose name is not known. Arriving in Chile in 1552 the Dominioans 
founded the convent of Nuestra Senora del RQs~io. Here they began their 
work, oaring primarily for the Spaniards. The following year the first 
Franciscan oonvent of Chile was established in Santiago.4l By 1593 the 
,.. 
Dominioans had four oonvents in Chile, the Francisoans, eight, the Meroedar-
ians, six, while the Agustinians were not to arrive for two more years.42 
The work of the olergy had been oentered among the Spaniards and the efforts 
direoted toward the oare of the Spaniards. 
, So great was the distanoe from the bishoprio of Cuzoo to the settle-
ments of Chile that it had been neoessary to ereot two bishoprios in Chile -
the first at Santiago, the seoond at Imperial.43 
This was the Chile to which the Jesuits were to oome. 
41Errazuriz, Los Orijenes, 103. 
42Ibid •• 440; Franoisoo Enrich. S.J., Histor.i~ ~!!:. Compania ~ Jesus !:!. 
ChIre, Baroelona, 1891, I, 9. 
43Err~zuri', ~ Orijenes, 191-193, 212-220. The diocese of Santiago was 
oreated by a papal bull on June 27. 1561, while that of Imperial was 
created Maroh 22. 1564. Carlos iilva Cotapos, Historia Eolesiastioa de Qh!!!, Santiago, 1925. 5, 12-13. 
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.' 
ssed the capability for treating suocessfully with suoh notably be11ig-poise 
erent natives. 
First among those of his seleotion was Luis de Valdivia. Not only had 
thi. padre exoelled in philosophy and theo1o,y,a but he was an especially 
.. douS missionary as had been displayed in Cuzoo and Ju1!'; at the time of 
Id. new appointment Padre Valdivia was master of the novices. 9 Born in 
Granada in 1561. he studied at Salamanoa. and. ·a.t the age o~ twenty entered 
the Sooiety in the province of Casti1e. lO Shortly after his ordination in 
1589 he was sent to Peru where for the next three years he served in various 
oapacities. trom teaching theology in Lima to laboring among the missions ot 
Ju1!. His linguistic ability (already he had aoquired co~d ot three na-
tiTe tongues), his e1oquenoe of delivery, his inte11eotual aOhievements. his 
administrative aptitude determined his se1eotion by Pinas. 
Inoluded also in this group were two Chileans. the padres Hernando de 
Aquil.ra and Juan de Olivares, the padres Luis d. Estela and Gabriel d. 
Vega and the hermanos coadjutores Miguel de Ta1ena and Fabian Martfnez.ll 
This little band reoeived the blessings of their provin.oial and t1A1r"1A,.,,,,.,,,, 
trOll Callao on the "San Franoisoo Javie~' February 9, 1593.12 .A. heavy gale I 
... pt the oraft from its oourse to Valparaiso. After SurviTing perilous 
provincial of the province of Peru. 
9 )(igu.1 de Olivares. S.J., Historia de la Compa.ii!a de Jesus !!. Chile, in 
C01.gQiOn Historia-dores, VII, 14. ----
lOiDrich, I, 14; Carlos Sommervoge1, S.J., Bib1iotheque de 1a Compagnie de 
U.lqy, Paris, 1908, 377-382. - - --
12Bnr1Ch, I, 14. 
Pablo Paste11s, S.J., Historia de 1a COmpania de Jesus en 1a Provincia del 
Paraguay, Madrid, 1912, I, 100.--- -- - -
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·' diffioulties the orew and the Jesuits disembarked at the port of Coquimbo. 
jnimated with holy gratitude. the padres walked barefoot from Coquimbo to 
La Serena (a distanoe of two and a half leagues). where they entered the 
ohuroh of San Franoisoo to offer prayers of J;~sgiving. 
While awaiting the oompletion of repairs on the ship. the padres d1s-
played suoh zealous charity among the inhabitants of this vioinity that it 
• waS with great sorrow that the natives bade them farewell. After the ship 
was onoe more oonsidered navigable. the inhabi tan ts of La Serena were oon-
vinced they could not detain these Blaok Robes; still they were unwilling to 
see them risk the further perils ot a sea voyage. They gave the padres 
mules that they might travel with less hazard by land. Continuing the 
journey to Santiago upon the beasts. they arrived at their destination April 
12, 1593.14 Rere a magnifioient reoeption had beenJrepared. They were 
ottered the hospitality of the prinoipal persons of the oity. The illustri-
ous prior of the Dominioan oOl1Tent. Fray Pedro Alderete and the learned pro! 
vinoial Franoisoo de Riveros graoious1y insisted upon sharing the Dominican 
abode with the padres. Nor would they oonsider the departure of the 
Jesuits until they should have suitable living quarters of their own.15 
In his sermon from the pulpit of the oathedral the tollowing Sunday 
Pinas struok the keynote ot the work of his Order, offering to ministe~ unto 
those who so desired, both native and Spaniard. during night or day, in the 
13Astra1n, IV, 670. 
14Pastells, I. 100. The'journey from Serena to Santiago was a distanoe ot 
160 leagues ot hard riding. 
150livares, C. H., VII, 18. 
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·' oamp or in the city, with no expeotation of temporal remuneration, reminding 
thea that all Jesuit labor was and is "Ad majorem Dei G10riam." lie realized 
further the pitiable poverty of the people; the drastio reverses they had 
suffered due to the war had 80 inoonvenieno\d'47them that he would expect not 
even residenoe or chapel, but only their enthusiasm and prayers.16 
Though Pinas expected no such donation, the inhabitants gathered fram 
among their ranks 3,916 pesos - sufficient to ;urChase a residenoe formerly 
of impressive worth whioh had been oooupied by the governor Rodrigo de 
Quiroga, but whioh had depreciated signifioant1y in value. Indispensib1. 
alterations were made upon this bUilding by Miguel de Te1ena. Six weeks 
later the residenoe was habitab1e.1? Though the primary purpose of the 
Jesuits was to establish themselves in missionary work among the natives, 
they resided in Santiago upon the insistanoe of the inhabitants, moved by th 
deplorable situation wrought by the oombat, aocepting only the essentials ot 
existence from these inhabitants.18 
As Piftas spoke in the oathedra1 to the Spaniards, Father lIernando de 
Aguilera was preaohing from the pulpit at Santo Domingo to the Indians in 
their own language. Encouraging was the joyous response of these natives wh I 
never before had heard the word of God uttered in their native tongue.19 
Until the Jesuits arrived in Chile, these Indians who took pride in their 
. 
language, were not to hear it raised to such a dignity. They flocked to 
Santo Domingo and to Aguilera tor instruotion. Exhuberant1y they oe1ebrated 
l~ioh, I, 20. 
17Errazuriz, Los Orijenes, 435; Enrioh, I, 21. 
18Errazuriz, toi Orijenes, 435. 
19Enrioh, I, 21=22. 
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in processions. taking great delight in the more oeremonious aspect ot 
religion. 
Each padre was entrusted with a primary obligation. Valdivia was en-
charged especially with the instruotion ot~be Indians. Gabriel de Vegas. 
the morenos. Luis de Estella. the ohildren. Olivares. the Spaniards. and 
AgUilera. the natives and the negroes. 20 All heard confessions. adminis-
.. 
tared the saoraments. made regular visits to the prisons and hospitals. 
and exeroised other works ot oharity. 
Valdivia. impressed by the remarkable progress ot Aguilera. realized 
the prioeless asset ot the ability to reaoh the natives through their own 
language. Extraordinarily adept at philologioal pursuits, he was. in a 
very short time. hearing confessions. preaohing and oonversing in the native 
tongue.21 Bis deep conoern tor the natives stirred him to ever inoreasing 
activity. The unhappy prisoners ot war. among those natives most despised • 
... 
20Ibid., I. 26-27; Errazuriz. 29. oit •• 436; Astrain, IV, 671. 
2liUO:h issue has been taken in calCUlating the exaot length ot time it took 
Padre Valdivia to learn the language ot the Chileans. He is oredited by 
some as learning the language in three days. others in nine days. still 
others in twentrtwo to twenty-eight days. Olivares. in Coleccion Historia t 
dores, VII, 18; Enrioh. I, 22; Errazuriz, Los Orijenes. 434; Jost Toribio 
Medina, Biblioteca Hisrano-Chilena, Santiago de Chile; 1897, I, 189-192. 
Doubtless Padre Valdiv a applied himselt to the study of the language while 
on the two m.onth voyage from Peru to Chile in the company of the two 
Chilean tathers. Hia appreoiation ot the neoessity ot possessiag th, 
knowledge ot the language in order to taoilitate the oonversion ot the 
Indian prompted him to work out a grammar of the Arauoanian language whioh 
was printed in Lima in 1606. Medina, 2£. oi t., II, 386. Not oontent with 
delivering sermons he arranged a dialogue form of the dogmas of the Faith 
whioh he later oomposed into a oateohism. Medina,~. oit., I, 109-111; 
Rodolfo R. Sohuller. Disoovery ot a Fra~t ot the-pr~ ~ ot the 
~ ~ ~ J(illcay;a.o ta:nguage ~ Luis..!. alcrrvI'a; Cambridge,-T9I'!'.-
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.' found to their amazement a patient friend in this Black Robe who con-
sumed himself in assisting the.m. 22 
A year after the arrival of the Jesuits in Chile, Pinas, feeling the 
infirmities of his age, returned to Peru. He-bad witnessed the establish-
.. "7 
ment of the Jesuit residence and chapel in Santiago, the advances madeby 
the padres into the hearts of the natives, and the beginning of the Jesuit 
instruction in Chile23 Upon his retirement Vafdivia was named rector of 
santiago in reoognition ot his ability and fervor. Not only did the ambi-
tious padre oontinue to hold a ohair of philosophy at the oollege of 
Santiago, attend the prisoners of war and other natives within the City, but 
he travelled to the most remote haoiendas to attempt to alleviate the dis-
tress of the hapless victims of personal service. 24 
Valdivia convinced Governor Don Mart!n ~ez de Loyola not only of the 
desirability, but of the necessity cf having priests who were versed in the 
., ... 
22Enrich, I, 28. 
23A this time P. Bal tasar de Pws was 67 years old. He died in Peru in 161 
at the age of 84, having been in the Society 62 years, and professed 47. 
Enrich, I, 37-45. 
24m 1594, on the day of the Asuncion, Olivares was teaching grammar to the 
children of the Sp8.Diards while Padre Valdivia began a course ot instruot- I 
ion in philosophy tor the religious students of the Dominicans, Francis~ 
cans, and mercedarians who had been established in Chile. The college of 
San Miguel ATcanjel was built due to the generosity ot the coadjutors 
Andres de Torquemada and Agusth Brisceno, both of whom were exceptionally 
fervent Christians. They arranged to donate "inter vivos" from theia' 
haciendos, reserving the usufruot tor the rest of their lives. Valdivia, 
on OCtober 16, 1595, formally aooepted the donation in the name of the 
General Claudio Aquavlva. Among the first students at the college were 
eleven Dominicans, six Franciscans, and several Meroedarians. Olivares, 
in Co1eccion Historiadores, VII, 25. Enrich, I, 52-54; Errazuriz, Los 
Orljenes., 437. 
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·' native language minister to them. Thus it was that Padres Hernando de 
Aguilera and Gabriel de Vega went to Arauoo where their efforts among the 
natives were well repaid spiritually.25 They baptized the ohildren. the 
aged. and the infirm. though they with held .tAp saorament from the others 
• "7 
until they should have instructed them thoroughly in the fundamentals of 
Christianity.26 While a cessation of hostilities had been temporarily 
effected in Arauco and Tucapel when the Jesuittarrived, the natives were 
offered no instruotion. 27 Aguilera and de Vega were soon replaced in order 
that they might introduoe their methods in the vicinity of Angol, Concepcion. 
Imperial, Oscrno and Valdivia. Here these spiritual trail blazers met with 
similar indioations of success.28 Assisting them in the missions were the 
captain Andres de Torquemada and Agust!n Brioeno as well as l4aestre de 
Campo, Jeronimo Bravo de Saravia.29 
Mention has been made of visits to the Indians on the enoomendadas. 
The fathers also journeyed regularly to the Indian ranoherios. where they ... 
assembled the natives, taught them pious practioes, and acquainted them with 
the singing of hymns in their own language. 3D More clearly than. perhaps, 
even his visits midst the prisoners on the frontier, did these inspections I 
reveal to Valdivia the futility ot hoping for true spiritual progress under 
the existing system of personal service. Nor was it possible to express to 
25Cl audio Gay. Ristoria Fisica Z Politioa ~ Chile segur Documentos 
Adquiridos en esta ReEublica Durante Doze ~os de Res dencia en Ella, 
Santiago de ChIle, Is 4. II, 215-216.- - - - -
260livares, in Colecci6n Historiadores, VII. 45. 
n -Ibid., VII. 45. 
28Errlzuriz. Los Orijenes, 437. 
29Agust{n Bric'!o later gave up all his worldly goods to become a coadjutor 
,temporal. Ibid., 435. 
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these natives the essence of the Christian spirit When they were so bonded 
by the encomenderos. 
At best the padres could present only inadequately the more superficial 
aspects of the Faith to the natives held in ~oRdage. Little was being 
accomplished in aotually altering their moral concepts. One typical 
instance of such inadequacy is illustrated by a visit made by the Valdivia 
and Aguilera to a rancherio to find the native I combining their knowledge of 
religious ceremony with their barbarous bachannalian revelry. In a frenzy 0 
inebriation they were cavorting fantastically waving the cruoifixes given 
them by the padres. Though they expressed sorrow for their actions When 
reprimanded. it was extremely doubtful that their sorrow would restrain them 
fram future debauchery. While the padres were able to lessen the disorder 
around Santiago by prevailing upon the alcalde mayor to ban the giving of 
liquor to the Indian. they laoked the cooperation of the encomendero who was 
not averse to such inbibing if it tended temporarily to satisfy the DAtive~ 
and thus ward off possible revolt.~l 
The spiritual victories of the padres along the frontier convinced them 
cf the wealth cf souls that could be harvested under more peaoeful situation I 
Atter happy contaot had been made with the natives of Arauoo Padre Valdivia 
continued from Santiago to Conoepci6n. Dispatching Padre Gabriel de Vega to 
teach a course in arts at the college of San Miguel in Santiago. he continued 
accompanied by Aguilera and lay brother Miguel Telena. in an expedition alo~ 
the frontier to preaoh to the Spaniards and to evangelize the natives. 32 
3lEnrich. I. 24-25. 
320livares. in Colecci;n Bistoriadores. VII. 46-47. 
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They returned to Arauco where they baptized many whom they had previously 
instructed. From there they went to Imperial. Villarica. Valdivia and 
osorno. In these more remote trontier towns they were discouraged by the 10 
moral conduct ot the Spanish soldiery. Dur"''''''' this seven month expedition of 
"':;'"tll'7 
1597. the padres baptized an impressive number ot infidels. But they sensed 
a growing native resentment towards the conduct ot the Spaniards.33 Throngs 
of natives tlocked to hear tham speak. Sendttve to the rapidity with which 
the natives were being roused to the boiling point ot rebellion. the padres 
warned the Spaniards upon their return to the college of Santiago. though 
suoh warnings met with derision or indifterence.34 
The cauldron of rebellion was not long in boiling over. On November 22. 
1598. while camping on their march from Imperial to Angol. G~vernor »artfn 
Garcia onez de Loyola and his company of sixty ofticers with three Francis-
cans were slain by Indians led by the cac!que Paillamachu. 35 Within two days 
the Cunchese and Huilliches provinces were in the throes or revolt as well'~ 
. the Araucanians or Osorno. Valdivia. Villa.rica. Imperial. Canete. Angol. Co~ 
and the fortress of Arauco. Six cities were destroyed - Imperial. Vil1arica. 
Valdivia. Angol. Santa Cruz. Canete and Osorno. 35 Upon the death or Loyola I 
the seventy year old Pedro de Viscara was selected by the Cabildo ot Santiag 
to act as governor. Gathering all possible reenforcements he had the inhabi 
~3Enrich. I. 64-55. in Co1ecci~n Historiadores. 
Q401ivares. VII. 46-47; EnriCh. !. 87-S8. 
35Mo1ina. II. 253. Rosales. II. 229-306. says these Indians or Puren were 
led by Anganamon and Pe1antaro. 
360livares. VII. 47; Rosales. 305-355. 
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tents from Angol and Coya repeople Conoepcion and Chillan.37 Six months 
later the viceroy dispatohed Franoisoo Quinones to Chile as governor. 
Quinones ruthlessly waged savage though ineffectual battles. Conquering by 
means of terrorization proved a poor method~,n dealing with enraged people 
who knew no fear, but in whom severity merely tapped new souroes of resist-
ance. 38 In February, 1601, Alonso de Ribera became governor, and he con-
tinued the ineffectual struggle. In the repcrt delivered to the viceroy in 
Lima, April 30, 1601, it was stated that there had been twelve oities 
ad from the cordilleras to the west - Coquimbo, Santiago, Conoepoion, Chill 
Millapoa, Arauoo, Angol, Imperial, Villarica, Valdivia, Osorno and Cilos. 
As a result of the slaying of the governor Millapoa was depopulated; as a 
result of this depopulation an attaok was made upon Chillan, Angol and Con-
cepoion. The city of Angol was burnt down and only one fortress remained 
with one hundred men and their families. Fire had demolished Chillan; fifty 
eight of the women of the fort had been carried away. Imperial withstood ~ 
cruel seige for over a year. Villarioa was demolished and Valdivia suffered 
great destruction. Osorno was destroyed. Only fcur of the twelve cities 
remained free from serious ru1Dation - Conoepoi6n, Arauco, Santiago and 
Coquimbo.39 The old settlements of Imperial and Angol had been permantly 
abandoned. Tuouman was similarly given up while Conoepcion was destroyed 
several times. The physical results of this revolt are harrowing to relate; 
the spiritual and moral entailed more serious aftermaths. Hatred and savag 
37Molina, II, 254; Rosales, 304-326. 
38Enrich, I, 77-78; Rosales, II, 355. 
39pastells, I, 201-203. 
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raged on both sides. The Spaniards viewed the revolt not as an indication 
or result of their own harshness. but as evidence of their laxity in not 
thoroughly subduing the native Who by now had. it would seem. proven intract-
able. So bitter was the reaction of the Spaniards to this revolt that some .. .. , 
authors have stated there was unanimous approval of the most rigid enforce-
ment of severe for.ms of personal service by civilians and ecclesiastics as 
well as among the soldiers.40 This cannot be ;-aid of Padre Valdivia. who 
continued to foster the belief of his Society that slavery was not the 
answer to the revolt; slavery had been the cause. 
In 1602 Padre'Paez on his first journey to Chile as visitador. was 
grieved to learn of the conditions wrought by the war. 4l After conducting a 
4ONote the statements to this effect found in Domingo AmunAtegui y Solar. 
Las Encamiendas de Indijenas en Chile. Santiago. 1909. I. 355. Hereafter 
~e cited as LOilncomlendaS-and in Errazuriz. Continuac!on de los 
Seis ~os de la:afstoria de Chile. I. 291-292. -----
- In a tr"atado presented to the viceroy in 1601 the licentiate don 
Melchor Calderon. treasurer of the Cathedral of Santiago and Vicar Gener«! 
of the Bishopric expressed the idea that slavery was the only answer to 
Chilets problem. His justification for slavery was based upon the assump-
tion that since conquest of the land could be considered just. such means 
as would be necessary to effect the conquest would be of necessity just. 
He held that the native of Chile would be pacified only by the harshest of 
measures; therefore the harshest of measures should be condoned. Medina. 
Biblioteca Hispano Chilena. II. 5-20. 
Siiilar' sentiments were expressed by captain Domingo de Eraso. the 
procurador general of Chile whose relation of 1603 summerizes the opinions 
of the prinoipal personages of Chile as to the most plausible method of 
pacifioation of the natives. Ibid •• 38-44. 45. 
Fear was expressed that s'liOiiI'd any of the natives be freed from the 
bondage in which they were admittedly held. they would merely revert back 
to their pagan ways. 
4lOlivares. C.R •• in Colecci6n Historiadores. VII. 49-51. 
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.' investigation of the situation around Concepcion, where he had also occupied 
himself in preaohing and administering the saoraments, he travelled to the 
troubled Santiago where he visited the Jesuit oollege. BiB report ooncer 
the work of the Jesuits was one of only the e~hest oommendation for zeal 
and progress despite the havoo into which the province had been thrown.42 
Paez complied with Ribera's request for two padres to work along the frontier. 
sending Fathers Gabriel de Vega and Franoisco ~llegas who attempted to 
alleviate the distress spiritual and physioal of the frontier native.43 
At this time Valdivia was sent to Peru to take a ohair in theology at 
the college in Lima. 44 Olivares and Aguilera were also transferred fram 
42Ibid., 51 
43Ibid., 54. The influenoe of these padres was great even over the soldiers 
so-accustaned to laxity. The governor Ribera had been reenforced with 
troops from Spain, Peru, and Buenos Aires; the f~ victories of 1602 were 
not sufficient to be considered true suooess. Aware of the prestige of th 
members of the Society he had requested that missionaries accompany his 
military expeditions in order to renew the morale of his own soldiers as 
well as to influence them morally and help pacify the natives. These ~ 
padres reported their progress to their superior. In their letters of 
February28 and March 5, 1603, they wrote that in the fort of santa Margar-
it de Lebu they had heard the confessions of sixty Spanish soldiers and ha 
been gratified by the reaction of both the Spaniards and the natives to 
their preaching; after they had distributed Communion there they went to 
Santa Ines de Paicabi (or Paicavi) where they likewise achieved happy re-
sults. Enrich, I, 88-89. Ribera wrote to the oabildo and to his general 
in Santiago lauding the zealous missionaries. Ibid., 90. 
44Although he had never failed to perform his duties as rector of the colleg 
of San Miguel in Santiago with conscientious precision. Padre Valdivia 
seemed to be working under great difficulties. His was a battle against a 
depressive melancholy which upon occasions manifested itself in his des-
perate requests to return to Spain. Visitador Esteban Paez had written to 
the General Padre Claudio Aquaviva that though Padre Valdivia was an ex-
tremely religious man, he was painfully distracted in his position as 
rector. It seems that whereas Padre Valdivia possessed unusual aptitude 
for academic instruction and administration, he had continually to battle 
a pervasive dejection while so occupied; he did not indicate such torments 
when laboring midst the natives, on the other hand. Though he seemed to 
have conquered this fraility, he succumbed to it again while teaching in 
I 
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Chile to Peru.45 
Valdivia had derived through his missionary experiences the knowledge 
of the fundamental facts of the Indian problems there. In attaining this 
knowledge he conoluded the preparatory phas~Qf his career ~ong and in 
behalf of the Arauoanians. The seoond phase, that of ohampioning the oause 
of the Arauoanians, was to witness his endeavors in Peru, again in Chile, 
and then in Spain. 
Lima. His request to be tansferred to Spain was gently refused by Padre 
General Aquaviva, who saw fit to have him ade rector of the oollege in 
Lima. The Padre General was not unsympathetic however, for he sought to 
console Padre Valdivia in his struggle against his disoouragement. Astra 
IV, 692-693. 
It is interesting to note that in 1600 Padre Valdivia had been re-
quested to oome to Lima by Padre Rodrigo de Cabreado who was desirious of 
his assistance. Greatly alarmed by the possibility of the departure of 
the padre, the Cabildo of Santiago wrote to the superiors of the provinoe 
pleading to retain Padre Valdivia whose servioes they felt were essential 
to the pacification of the Indians. Enrioh, I, 81-82. When the cabi~do 
understood more fully just how Padre Valdivia would accomplish pacification 
they were not so anxious to retain his presenoe. .~ 
45Enrioh, I, 81. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRESENTATION AND ADOPTION OF GUERRA DEFENSIVA 
. 
• ;; 47 The war was oont1nuing. perhaps less destruotively but then there was 
less lett to be destroyed. Hatred and vindiotiveness seemed ever to mount 
new heights. The Arauoanian leader Paillamaoh'l who died in 1603 had been 
suooeeded by a toqui. Huneoura, who was equally indisposed to treat with the 
spaniards.l Alonso Ribera, no longer among the king's ohosen people sinoe 
he had wed a daughter of Aguilera without obtaining the royal sanotion, 
suffered ohastisament by being transferred to Tuo~. Onoe again Garo!a 
Ramon was appointed governor of Chile. In 1604 Chile, previously part of 
the provinoe of Peru, was made a division of the newly founded Paraguayan 
provinoe whioh inoluded also Buenos Aires and TUouman. 
Reourring demands were issued by the king to curtail the war. Those 
in authority were interested in olearing up this situation which was beoo.mi 
inoreasingly intolerable. The Conde de Monterrey, who had sucoeeded Velasoo, 
Marques de Salina, as vioeroy of Peru in 1604, was espeoially pressed by the 
king to seek a cession of the expensive warfare in Chile. Hearing of 
Valdivia's disoussions in regard to the oauses of the war, he requested the 
padre to render a detailed aooount of the situation, clarifying espeoially 
those more vital grievanoes of the natives agravating them to hostility. 
The memorial oomposed in oompliance with this request deolared personal 
service to be the underlying souroe of all the evils that had arisen in the 
lMolina, II, 261. 
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struggles between the Araucanians and the Spaniards; it justified the 
natives in their rebellion against such wretched subjugation.2 
To give consideration to this memorial a conferenoe was held by the 
most notable personages of Peru including thf'$overnor elect of Chile. 
Garc!a RamOn. the alcalde de oorte Aouna. the oider Juan Videla. the former 
alcalde ~corte and acesor to the vioeroy Padre Francisoo Coello. and Val-
divia. 3 This junta. resolving to abolish perstnal servioe. allowed two 
years for the aooomplishment of the transition from forced to voluntary 
labor. though it strongly urged that this transition be effeoted sooner.4 
Valdivia was delegated to acoompany Luis de la Torre upon a tour of 
2Enrioh. I, 100-101. ~tegui y Solar. Las Encomiendas. II. 371. 373. 
stresses the fact that since the oider Juan de Villela or Videla had pre-
sented a plan similar to that expounded by Valdivia. Valdivia should not 
be credited as the originator of the plan. This seems to be an unneoessary 
distinotion. It oertainly took no originality to reoognize the evils that 
had resulted from the personal service system in Chile. It is thus aot for: 
the theoretioal oreation of the plan later to be known as guerra defensiva . r 
that it is referred to as Valdivia's plan, but for his practical foster~ 
and initiation of it. 
stuis Tribaldos de Toledo, Vista Jeneral de las Continuadas Guerras Dificil 
Conquista del Gran Reino Provincias de ChIi~in Colecci6n Historiadores,' 
IV, 95. -- -
4COPii de Vna Carta del Padre Luys de Valdiuia Para el Fenor Conde de Lemos 
Pref dente de IndiaS';Lima. JanuarY4. 1657. photostat made by the-I 
Massachusetts Historioal Society, November, 1929. Number 245. 2. 
~----------------------------~ 
-32-
.' 
inspection in southern Chile to investigate the situation.5 Again Valdivia 
bad the opportunity to praotioe his zeal in oonverting. oivilizing. and 
proteoting his Arauoanians. Wi th great joy he embarked at Callao. aooomp 
also by the new governor Ramon and two hundr~~7so1diers. They dooked at 
Fenoo Maroh 19. 1605. It should be noted olearly that Valdivia was oom-
missioned as a oivil as well as eoclesiastioal personage. His authority was 
substantiated by oedulas given him. in Peru in ~e name of his Majesty. The 
phrasing of these oredentials authorized him. to enter into negotiations with 
"authoridad de Su Majestadft to ter.minate the war if possible.6 
At Penoo Garo!a Ramon reoeived his oommand. Valdivia immediately re-
sumed his work of preaohing and administering the saoraments to both Spaniard 
and Indians in the oity.7 This particular junoture during which the new 
governor was enoharged with his duties was a time of even less dioipline; 
the soldiers were in no mood and as yet under little compulsion to be sub-
jeoted to any effective restraint. while the Indians sensed the disadvantag: 
suffered by the Spaniards who were ohanging hores in the middle of the stre 
Stittle mention is made of Luis de la Torre in the aocounts of this journey 
or in the narratives oonoerning the deoision of the junta although Valdivia 
wrote that it was originally intended that only Luis de la Torre be dispat-
ohed upon this expedition; when the junta considered the grevious injustices 
that were being inflicted upon the natives through the personal servioe 
system. the decision was altered. It was resolved to send Valdivia to Chil 
to remind the infraotors of the instructions of the theologioal impli6ation 
of their wrongs. Copia de vna Carta del Padre Luye de Valdiuia Para el 
Fenor Conde de Lemos Prefidente de Infus. Lima. JanUAry 4. lS01;-r:-
6Astrain, IV. 696. - -
1Enrich. I. 103. 
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.' 
Instructions had been given Valdivia: 1) to offer a general pardon 
to the Indians for all their for.mer misdeeds; 2) to make it clear that the 
king had never approved personal service as it was practiced in Chile and 
that he now demanded its cession; 3) to re~~e tribute only in the for.m 
they were accustomed to pay in their own lands. 8 This third point. consider 
ing the fact that in their own lands the natives paid no tribute except in 
• times of war. would indicate that no tribute should be paid to the crown. 
The instructions were to be greeted with no joy on the part of the encomen-
deros and with far more than a grain of suspicion on the part of the Indians. 
The task of spreading the report of the new disposition of the king to 
abolish the grievances of the natives and come to a peaceful understanding 
was begun. Rumors dispersed across the lands. Wherever the peace rumors 
were heard they were believed. doubted. and frequently taken for a hoax. 
At Concepci5n Valdivia conversed with peaceful toquis in an informal 
,A-junta. At Santiago he had striven to impress the thousand soldiers who had 
just arrived from Spain with their legal and moral obligation to refrain 
from further antagonizing the natives and to comply with the instructions of 
the king and vioeroy.9 
Valdivia turned southward passing the Bio-Bio. At the fort of San Pedro 
he took part in another junta. this time with the caoiques of Lagunill~B.lO 
Similar juntas were held during all his travels. There was a willingness 
expressed by the natives to accept the Blaok Robes though they rejected the 
8~£ii de Vna Carta del Padre Liyslde Valdiuia Para el Fenor 
af dentede ~IndiaS:-January • tm'7. ~. - -
9Copia de Vn~Carta del Padre Luys1de Valdiuia Para el Fenor 
iSrefident6a"e IndiaS;-January 4. ~. 3. - -
-_.--" 
Conde de Lemos 
Conde de Lemo s 
• 
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military men. So suspicious were they ot the good faith ot the Spaniard tha 
frequently the padre had to summon all his powers ot persuasion to convince 
the native that the civil and military powers were cooperatillg with the 
. 
tathers. Unfortunately while this coope~ation was officially demanded the 
natives were not erring in their doubts. The military leaders merited SU8-
picion by constant breaches of agreements • 
• 
Accompanied for the most part by friendly toquis, the padre was joined 
occassionally by the maestre de campo Pedro Cort;s.ll Communioating his 
message ot peace Valdivia travelled from Arauco through Taboleuo, Lapier, 
Mahuda, the estado ot Catiray, down to Guadava, Puren, Catiray del Sur. to 
the tort ot Nuestra Senora de Ala.12 He cultivated the triendship ot the 
natives of Colcura, penquienhue, Quedioo, Quiapo, Tucapel, Lebulienooya and 
Cayaoupil deolaring peaoeful intentions and reoeiving reciprooal deolarations 
from the natives.1S 
Despite the many hazards Valdivia had orossed thesierras ot San Jeron' 
intending to again inspeot the tort ot Taboleu, or Taboledo, where Pedro 
Corte's had refused to relax his severity sinoe he held that the natives wou! 
{);I 
not cooperate with less harsh methods.14 Ignoring Pedro Corte.' warnings ot:: 
the impending danger he determined to seek out the oaoiques ot this territor" 
l0Don Vioente Carvallo i Goyeneohe, Desoripoion Historioo Geogratioa ~ 
Reino de Chile, in Coleoci6n Historiadores, VIII, 283. 
11co11a de Vna Carta del Padre LUls de Valdlula, op. oi t., 4. 
12Ib a:.,4.- - -
l301ivares, in Coleooion Historiadores, VII, 63. 
14Enrioh, I, 104-105. 
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Guided by the youthful son of Franoisco Ortiz, he met the toquis of this 
province, reproved them for failing to abide peacefully with the Spaniards, 
and asked them to explain their lack of cooperation.15 The toquis defended 
their belligerent attitude saying that should, they assume any other they 
would be forced to pay unwelcome tribute, serving in repartidos or encargados 
suoh service would force them to leave their wives and children. With the 
outlook of such inevitable injustioes, they delired no oontact with the 
Spaniards. 
Valdivia acknowledged their righteousness in rebellion against these 
abuses, but promised a rectification of such wrongs should a peace be con-
eluded. He extracted their promise as well as the promise of the toquis of 
Conupulli to assemble at the fort of Catiray to discuss negotiations, assur-
ing them of safe conduct. 
His numerous duties necessitated Valdivia's departure for Yumbel. Thus 
he dispatched a letter to the chaplain of Catiray concerning the affairs 
which the former companion of Valdivia, young Francisco Orti'"z, was to deliver 
, ... 
On his way trom Taboleu to Catiray the youth was cruelly slain by Indians 
fram Cunupulli, who, in all probability, were awaiting the padre a1so.16 The 
hostility toward the Spaniards was deeply rooted within the hearts of the 
Araucanians. The answer to this hatred was not, as was believed by pedro 
Cortes, to orush the natives until they no longer had capacity for any teel-
ing. but rather was to dispel their doubt through repititious Christi~ 
docility. 
l5Carvallo i Goyeneohe, Desoripoion Historioo Geogratica ~Reino ~ Chile, 
in Coleccion Historiadores, VIIi, 283. 
l6Carvai19 i Goyeneche, Descripoion Historico Geografica ~Reino ~ Chile, 
111 ... tJ.1J./. 
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Returning trom the fort of Yumhel Padre Valdivia established himself 
in the fort of Arauco from where he eventually returned to Peru.17 He had 
satisfied himself that his conclusions as to the oause of the native bellig-
erenoy were sound. In the latter part of AQr\~, 1606, he embarked for Peru. 
In a letter written the following January, the padre olearly expressed 
hiS reaotions to his investigation.1S He penned his great revulsion at the 
.. 
lack of respect shown the laws of God and of the king by the soldiers and 
the enoomsnderos of Chile. Especially disappointed was he in Garoia Romon 
whose hostile entrades belied the governor's portest that he was attempting 
peaoeful subjugation. In the odious abuses inflioted upon those indians 
even when they had submitted to peacefUl negotiations, he saw full justifi-
oatioD tor their rebellion. Again he denounoed personal servioe as the crux 
of the whole disorder.19 
~ Following the death of the Conde de Monterey, the Marques de Montes 
... 
Claros became viceroy. It was with his encouragement and approval that the 
oidor don Juan de Villela and Valdivia wrote their memorials to Spain in 
June, 1607, intensifying their arguments regarding the imperative need for a 
cessation ot the abuses resulting from the system of personal servioe in 
Chile.20 Again, in a letter of June 4, 1607, Valdivia foroibly expounded th 
l7Ibid., VIII, 2S4. 
18Valdivia to Conde de Lemos, January 4, 1607. 
19Valdivia to Conde de Lemos, January 4, 1607, 6. Padre Valdivia summed up 
his report saying: "Quedan aora a los de paz en mayor feruioio perfonal, 
porq muohos de los que y ban antes aminas fean aplicado por yaoonas a fUI 
enoomenderos juntos oon losq tenlan por efte Gouernador, el qual apubli-
oado autos de nuouo en queda por efc1auos a 108 indios de guerra q toman, 
y a Lima los traen vedidos (y con efta capa traen a muchos de paz) no 
auiendoles juftitioado e1 oumplimiento de las cartas de fU Mageftad, ouyo 
cumplimiento es neceffario para la juftifioacion de nra parte." 
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·' necessity of the abolition of personal service, the underlying oause of the 
hatred of the natives. He enunoiated the neoessity for limiting the Span~E 
to the territory north of the B!o-Bfo, advocating only defensive measures of 
war and the abolishment of forced labor - in ozher words the system which was 
• 47 
to be known as "guerra defensiva"~\'r defensive warfare. 
Governor Garo!a Ram&'n was making no pretense at pursuing the type of 
resistanoe advocated by Valdivia and approved ty the viceroy. He dispatched 
an order to marshall of oamp Lisperjer to raise the southern boundary of the 
Bfo-Bfo to Monterrey in order that Millapoa and Catiray might be included. 
He requested another thousand soldiers. On April 12, 1607, he had written 
to the king saying the Araucaniana had killed more than four hundred persons, 
that they respected no one, that they clamored against both cleric and 
soldier; he sincerely hoped no serious consideration be given this theory ot 
Valdivia. 22 
Due to the numerous defeats of the Spanish troops the Crown directed .~ 
Peru to send two thousand regular troops to the Araucanian border. 23 Natural 
foroes in Chile were joining in the destruction; the deluge of the Mapooho, 
famine, and looust devoured fields adding to the misery of the natives as 
well as to the expense of the Peruvian treasury in supporting the soldiers. 24 
On May 26, 1608, a royal c~dula announoed that all natives who should 
2Ovil1ela l s letter was written June 3, 1607. Shortly after this Villela was 
made President of the audiencia of Guadalajara. Astrain, IV, 694-696. 
21Ibid., 694-696. 2~ch, I, 113; Felipe Gomez de Vidaurre, S.J., Bistoria Ge0trafica, Natur~ 
2 y Civil del Reino de Chile, in Colecoion Historiadores, XV, 95. 
3M'olina, II;" 264. -
24Enrich, 113. 
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not aocept peaoe within the following two months would be enslaved.25 Here 
indeed his majesty Felipe III failed to exhibit the mercy or clemency so 
often attributed to h~ in offioial doouments. Sinoe 1518 when Rodrigo de 
Quiroga had reduced hundreds of natives io~lavery, transporting them to 
Coqulmbo, his successors not only rivalled his harshness but frequently sur-
passed hlm. 26 Following the revolt of 1598, ruthlessness in this regard had 
• bounded beyond all reason. Garcia Ramon had followed Riberats practice of 
oondemning all rebellious Indians to slavery or death. The disaster at 
Boroa, September 29, 1606, when more than one hundred Spanish soldiers periSh 
ed, dispelled what qualms might have existed among the members of the Counoil 
of Indies oonoerning the cruelest of oastigations. Under Merlo de la Fuente 
the enslavement cedula of 1608 was interpreted to pertain to all the natives 
of Chile, not only those on the frontier. 21 
Meanwhile, the Jesuit Provinoial Torres Bello, had written to the king 
pleading for abolition of "personal 8ervioe".28 He requested tvther that '/I X 
general pardon be extended to the natives absolving them from the punishment 
due any misdeeds they might have oommitted. So unsatisfactol")" was the pro.; 
gress with the king that Valdiviats ecclesiastioal and civil superiors de~ 
it desireable to have the padre present the plan of "guerra defenaiva" 
25~tegui Solar, ~ Enoomiendas, 184, 185-189, 189-196, 250; Rosales, II, 
411-481. 
26Amuru(tegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 353-354. 
21Actos de Cabi1da deifantiago, Coleccion de Historiadores, XXIV, 188-189. 
28Torres Summed up his letter sayrng, wTodos los hoiii'br.es pios i experimen:tadcs 
juzgan que la guerra mine a se acabara, sino es siendo por algunos anos 
defensiva, fortifioandose las dos buenos oiudades, i quitando el servioio 
personal jeneraImente, i dando a los indios libertad, i que con esto se 
pueden enviar relijiosos entre el10s, de liven ejemplo i sufioiencia en la 
lengua ••• "Amunategui Solar, OPe oit., I, 364-365. Torres beoame the 
r 
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personally. So it was that Padre Valdivia sailed for Spain in 1609, reach-
ing his destination in the middle of September or the early part of October 
to explain his plan in detail before the king and Council.29 
While there is no verbatim record of ~\,private audience Valdivia held 
with the king, there remains no doubt as to the outline of the plan presented 
nor of the kingts reaction to the presentation. Probably the most complete 
exposition of the padre's scheme of procedure, ·which he was called upon to 
amplify frequently and which many have interpreted in their own fashion, may 
be found in the padre's own explanation of the situation in a lengthly 
informado which was presented in Madrid probably in 1610. 30 
In the first of the eight chapters of his tratado he dwelled upon the 
inconveniences encountered in persecuting an offensive war, focusimg atteDtkm 
upon the faot that suoh a war not only impeded the evangelizing of the nativeE 
but was a source of lamentable moral degradation among the Spanish soldiers. 
He estimated that 2.600 Spaniards had perished in the war since 1606. 31 A· 
comparable number of infidel natives who had perished Without the opportunity 
of or desire for evangelization. 32 Nor were the pacified Indians spared the 
grief, but suffered from impoverishment, personal service, and attacks of 
hostile indians. Sinoe the war had assumed such proportions, personal servic~ 
had become more firmly and unjustly established regardless of provisio~s of 
the monarch. The padre did not hesitate to reveal the lack of cooperation 
first provincial of Chile in 1608. Astrain. IV, 684. 
29Astrain, IV, 691. 
30tuis de Valdivia, S.J., Tratado de la imLirtacia del medio, Que el virr~ 
propone ~ cortar ~ guerra .2!. cme:-l. zerIa sOliinente deTeiitru~.! va 1d 
1611" photostat made by the Massachusetts Historical Society, Feb.,'28, 
Number 264. 
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given by the authorities of Chile to the instructions of the viceroy in 1606 
which directed the eventual abolition of slavery after a thorough investi-
gation assisted by numerous conterences with jurists and theologians.33 
Aside from the spiritual loss. he recognize~~pe tremendous waste the war 
wrought upon the king's Chilean domain. The salary of the superabundance of 
soldiers had mounted from three or four thousand pesQs to eight thousand 
pesos annually since the entrance of Garcia R~n as governor. 34 Their lack 
of substantial success in offensive warfare served to metamorphise a paying 
project to an eternal debt. 
In the second chapter of his tratado Valdivia dealt with the general 
difficulties encountered in terminating the war through offensive tactics. 
The geographical problem in itself was insurmountable. The territory in 
rebellion covered almost one hundred leagues north and south from the 
cordilleras on the east to the Pacifio on the west. Of these the northern-
most forty leagues had been battling since th~ Spaniards entered Chile. 35 
Sucoessful conquest of the land would require countless substantial presidios. 
In the short distance of twelve leagues from Arauco to Tucapel and thence to 
Catiray seven or eight presidios were needed. 36 It seemed improbable that 
sufficient forts could be built to defend future conquests when the Spaniards 
were finding it difficult to retain those already made. Revolts in presidios. 
3lValdivia, Tratado !!!..!!. importacia ~ m!dio, que !! virref propon!, ~ 
cor tar la ~uerra de Chile, zhazerla soiamente defenfiua, • 
32Ibid. ,- 2: - · 
33'fiiId., 3. 
34Ib'icf., 4. 
35-Ibid •• 4. 
36Ib:rcr., 5. The presidios referred to were those of San Felipe de Arauco. 
Santa Margarita en Leico, the fort of Paioavi, that of San Jer6nimo, of 
Nacimiento, of Monterey de la Frontera and that of San Pedro. 
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.' 
Tucapel for example, coupled with internal biokering among the soldiers 
offered a source of danger as it was. 37 Already the oaptains were finding 
it difficult to dioipline their soldiers within the presidios. Under such 
conditions it was impossible to found new ci~i!s and thus improve the royal 
hacienda of Chile. Without the friendly assistance of the surrounding 
natives there would be great difficulty in construoting the cities and no 
assurance against immediate destruotion. The ~ughness of the land of war, 
the neoessity of searohing for the enemy upon his own ground, the absenoe of 
profit and the ever oompounding expense contributed towards the futility of 
offensive warfare. 38• A sufficient supply of horses would in itself prove a 
tremendous expenditure, though they proved ineffeotual when in pursuit of the 
agile Arauoanian who knew his land with all its orevices. Already the 
viceroy had sent from ten to twelve thousand pesos to Paraguay to purohase 
horses for the oavalry of Chile. The number, great as it was, was not 
etfeotive. 39 On the other hand, in defensive warfare it was the infantry, .~ 
not the oavalry, that was far more serviceable as well as far less expensive. 
Valdivia sought to analyse the purpose for whioh the a~ was inflioting 
its attaoks. It seemed their objeot was to display military supremaoy in all t 
seotions of the land regardless of oost or intrinsio aohievement. They mis-
interpreted the desire of the king that the war be terminated to mean that 
the Indian be exterminated. Could suoh an objeotive be oonsidered ethioal it 
would still be impossible. When, in the early part of his seoond year as 
37Ibid., 5-6. 
38Ibid., 7. 
39Ibid., 8 • 
......... 
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.' 
governor, Garc{a Rambn had waged war so ruthlessly pardoning no one, he 
did not seem to diminish the armies of the Araucanians to any appreciable 
extent. They merely dispersed themselves among the foothills and mountains. 
Yet despite their tactics, it was not the g~~70f the soldiers to annihilate 
all of the natives, since they would thereby lose a profit in the capturing 
of victims for personal service. 
comendero was not their atm. 40 
Surely a labor shortage harmful to the en-
• 
Valdivia publicly censured the governors who forced the natives to 
depopulate their own land Within a stipulated number of year., thereby not 
pacifying the natives, but driving them back to nurse their hatred to a re-
newed display of belligerency. 
In summary the first five chapters of the tratado presented logically 
the desirability of discontinuing an offensiTe war, giving economic, social, 
and religious reasons. The last three chapters of the tratado concerned 
.... 
largely the outstanding events that had ocourred during the war, a historical 
survey which concluded with an outline of the padres t procedure for effecting 
an eventual cessation of the war. 
Valdivia urged that a general pardon be extended to the Indians for all 
their misdoings. Since the natives had been degraded and abused at the 
hands of the Spaniards. they could soarcely be expeoted to tolerate entradas 
of military men or of civilians; on the other hand they had shown themselves 
kindly disposed toward the men of the cross. Therefore the most oonvenient 
40Ibid., 11. 
-
I 
·' and logical expedient would be to erect a border between the AraucaniaBs 
and the Spaniards at the B1o-B{o, beyond which only the men ot the cross 
would pass in order to Christianize the natives and instill true sentiments 
ot friendship. 
Captain Lorenzo del Salto had been commissioned by Garc!a Ramon to 
contradict any attempts to otticially inaugurate the system tostered by 
Valdivia. In order to present the advantages ~tained by the governor, del 
SaIto stated that within the last two and a halt years ot Ramon's governor-
ship nine hundred natives had been slain and more than three thousand taken 
prisoners - a tact that should instill tear in the hearts ot the Araucanians 
and thus lead to eventual submission.4l 
In the tirst session ot the Council ot Indies. January 2. 1610, but one 
member. the Marques de Villaher.mosa, expressed a doubt concerning Valdivia's 
plan; aiter studying the more detailed memorial he too voted in tavor ot 
"guerra detensiva".42 The Council appointed a military committee over whi~ 
the president ot the Council, Conde de Lemos presided. Again Valdivia and 
Lorenzo del SaIto were called upon to present their divergent opinions; 
again the padre's plan held a decided tavorable balance. 43 Detensive war-
tare was adopted otticially.44 Forts were to be retained along the trontier 
ot the Bfo-B!o sufticiently guarded to be capable ot resisting any attacks • 
. 
Two hundred thousand pesos were to be paid trom Lima tor the support ot the 
4lEnrich, I, 178. Luis Tribaldos de Toledo, Vista Jeneral de las Continuadas 
Guerras Ditioil Conquista del Gran Reino, Provincias ~ CEIle;-in 901ecc1nn 
Historladores. IV. lo~-105;------
42Enrich. I, 230. 
43Astrain, IV, 698. 
44Enrich, I. 231; Toledo, in Coleccion Historiadores, IV. 105. 
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.' 
army in Chile. Personal service was to be entirely abolished. Prisoners ot 
war were not to be enslaved. Just payments were to be made by the pacified 
Indians to the king. Jesuits were to reside in the torts along the frontier 
from where they would supervise the treatme~·~t the pacified natives and 
make their entradas into the Indian territory to convert the intide1. 
The indulgences granted by Pope Paul V later in the year, October 13, 
1610 in the "pastoris eterni" reveals the attitude ot thepope towards the 
negotiations during this conterence.45 Concerned only with the spiritual 
implications, these indulgences favored the method ot "guerra detensiva". 
When the plan had been tormally accepted, the selection ot the most 
workable means ot execution confronted the authorities. Both ecclesiastical 
and temporal or civil authority had to be delegated. Upon first consideratiD 
this would leem a less complicated matter than was the adoption ot the plan 
itself; still tar more deliberation and consultation was required betore the 
final decision could be ratified. Since the Bishop ot Santiago had among bfs 
451) To eaoh one who said a prayer tor the conversion ot the Indians ot Chile 
and their reduction to peace without the shedding ot blood, was granted a 
remission of the punishment due one third ot his sins. A plenary indu1~c 
was granted on teast days, should the prayers be said atter the sacraments 
of Contession and Communion. 2) To each one, who, in order to accomplish 
such a peace, concerved the indians, or exercised other virtues ot charity 
or mercy or justice towards the natives, with the ordinary requirements 
fulfilled, should receive a plenary indulgence. 3) Each person who helped 
whether or not through a third party, in the conversion of the rebellious 
indians or in the mediating without bloodshed, toward the end ot the sal-
vation of their souls, ~u1d gain a plenary indulgence of the punishment 
due their sins. 4) Each one who should convert an intidel or baptize one 
already converted, or preach the doctrine or administer the sacraments, 
having said mass or confessed or received Communion should be granted a 
plenary indulgence. 5) Each native who helped his brother hear the 
Christian doctrine or sermon or mass, or who assisted in the ministry shoUl 
gain a plenary indulgence. 6) Whenever persons who had fulfilled any ot 
the above requirements should be in danger of death, he could gain a 
I 
-45-
numerous aversions a most pronounced animosity towards the Jesuits. it was 
impossible to expect his oooperation. This aversion was not necessarily 
created by Padre Valdivia for it had been evidenoed before the padre had be-
come so important.46 The king strongly favor~ conferring the dignity of th 
Bishopric of Imperial upon Valdivia.47 Felipe III was not alone in his 
selection. In a letter from the vioeroy of Peru, the Harques de Montes 
• Claros, on April 30, 1610, the k~ received the highest recommendation to 
this effect.48 The viceroy lauded the ability, zeal, and integrity of the 
padre, expressing the opinion that as Bishop of Imperial he could best fUl-
fill the new obligations and responsibilities of inaugurating "guerra 
defensiva". June 2, 1610 the name of Valdivia was formally proposed. 
The Jesuit General, Claudio, was giving the matter of the possible 
episcopal appointment of Valdivia serious consideration. His letter. direc 
to the provincial of Toledo, bespeaks his conviction that the padre was well 
plenary indulgenoe by saying "Jesus", should he possess true contrition 
and be unable to make his Confession or receive the Holy Eucharist. 7) 
Each person who had gone to Communion and who prayed for a quarter of an 
hour mentally or vocally in behalf of the conversion of the natives of 
Chile would reoeive an indulgence. Carvallo i Goyeneche, in Coleccion 
Historiadores, VIII. 290-291. 
46Rosaies. II, 531. 
47Molina. II, 266. 
48The viceroy wrote: "y cierto que yo tengo hecho tan buen concepto del P. 
Luis de Valdivia, que aunque sea la pretensi6n oontro su humilidad i 
instituto de 1a Compan!a, holgar!a de verle Obis~o de la Imperial y que 
asistein-eira en la Conoepcion mientras esta oiudad se poblase. Vuestra 
Majestad proveira 10 que mas conviene a su serviero." Astrain, IV, 701. 
I 
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qualified for the dignity.49 Two months later, however, Aquaviva expressed 
a doubt that the objectives of "guerra defens1va" could be most effectively 
attained by the assumption of this office.50 Never had Valdivia indioated an 
inolination to consider the dignity o~ the9b!shopric necessary or desireable. 
He had stressed not infrequently the importance of having the executor of 
this plan free trom the jurisdiction of the bishop. and it cannot be said 
.. 
that he suggested that the bishopric be assumed by the individual Who should 
direot the plan. 51 
In his letter to the secretary of the Council of Indies Valdivia stated: 
four primary objections to the authority of the director of "guerra defensi~ 
being subordinated to the bishop of Imperiala 1) should the bishop refuse 
to entrust the administration of that frontier section of his diocese where 
the supervision of "guerra defensiva" should be controlled by Valdivia or 
by his companions, the purpose of their voyage would have been defegted; 2) 
were authority conferred upon hbn through the bishop, Valdivia or the direct-
or could not subdelegate power, tor such a ruling existed due to the vast 
distance intervening between the colony and the mother country; thus through 
technicalities ot organization might acoomplishment be seriously impeded; 3} 
should the bishop die, negotiations would sutter unnecessary delay for with-
out authority there would be a cumbersome state of indeoision; 4) the grave 
problem ot differentiating between the ecclesiastical and civil supervision 
would be aocentuated.52 Due in large to his own protestations, Valdivia was 
49Ibid., IV. 710-711. 
501bra., IV. 711. 
51Ibtd •• IV, 712-713. 
52ibid., IV. 704. 
-
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not made bishop of Imperial. He was, however. oonsidered free from Jesuit 
ecclesiastioal jurisdiction in the New World when the General dispensed him 
from all suoh supervision, holding him directly aooountable to the General 
himself.53 Various titles have been used in.r~ference to Valdivia, among 
which have been "vioe-provinoial" or -superior of the frontier missions"; 
the important fact, disregarding the formal title, lay in the free rein 
given to him. 54 While he was given exoeptional·freedom of action, the 
weight ot responsibility placed upon him was proportionately inoreased. 
The very nature of the polioy of "guerra defensiva" demanded a close 
cooperation of Churoh and state and in this case a close union of the 
religious and the political progr~; therefore eoclesiastioal as well as 
civil powers were oombined in the authority of the director of the new syst 
At the formal meeting oalled to oonfer the neoessary authority, Deoember 9, 
1610, Valdivia was intrusted with extensive and elastic powers to enable him 
to arrange the inauguration of defensive warfare.55 He was to aot as oivil~ 
visitador of Chile - equivalent to providing him with supreme political oon-
trol over affairs of the Indian frontier. 56 This appointment was subject to 
53Ibid., IV, 707. 
54JOir Toribio Medina, Diooionario Biografioo Colonial de Chile, Santiago. 
1905, 898, speaks of the padre as vIce-provinoIal of Paraguay as does 
Rosales, !strain, following P. Lozano, holds that Padre Valdivia was made 
offioial superior of the missions in Chile, IV, 706. All agree thatne was 
free from the supervision of any but the General. 
Sinoe Chile had been made a vioe-provinoe of Paraguay it is not unlike 
ly that Valdivia also held the title of vioe-provinoial. No one else held 
the title at this time. Medina, Biblioteoa Hispano-Chilena, I, 182. 
55Inoluded in this junta were three Who had been espeoially adamant in their 
disapproval. Still the majority were in favor of oonferring great power 
upon Padre Valdivia. Astrain, IV, 705. 
5601ivares, in Coleooi~n Historiadores, VII, 72. 
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the approval of the viceroYJ there was no doubt as to its ratifioation. Lad-
en with official letters and oredentials for the dignitaries of Peru and 
Chile, Valdivia oompleted preparations for his return voyage • 
.. .. ., 
I 

50 
.' 
for the crown.5 The governor and all the civil and military officials were 
instructed to cooperate with the directions of the padre. 
On the 29th of March, 1612, the slavery law of May 26, 1608 which had 
condemned to bondage all natives not dispcs~~~o cease warfare, was 
abrogated.6 On September 8, 1610, a letter had been written by the king to 
gorgo the application of his 1608 ruling until "la guerra defensiva" should 
• be put into execution, and then to apply it to all natives who should not 
desist from offensive warfare.? These latter provisions indicated that all 
the natives who had been paying personal service but who should agree to de-
fensive warfare should be given their liberty. On December 8. 1610, the 
king had given Valdivia a letter addressed to the "cac!ques, capitanes, 
toquis, i indios principales de las provincias de Chile" in which the new 
policy of pacification was carefully explained.8 It was admitted that per-
sonal service was vexatious to these Chileans, to the point of arousing 
their righteous belligerency; therefore all previous hostile actions of the~ 
Indians against the Spaniards were forgiven. 
Another order or provision was issued giving approbation to the dis-
mantling and depopulating of all those forts unessential to the maintenance 
of the defensive frontier along the B{o-B!o.9 Henceforth the frontier would 
. 
2The exact date of departure is unknown. 
3Rosa1es, II, 534-535, 539-543. 
'Ibid., II, 531-532. 
5Ibid., II, 543- ; 539-543. 
6Ibid., II, 535-536. 
7Ibid., II, 536. 
~ •• II, 533. 
9Marob 29, 1612, ~., II, 537-539. 
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be guarded by the forts of Cayuguano, Yumbel and Santa Fe to the north of 
the B(o-B!o. and by Nacimiento. Monterrey. San Jer6nimo and Arauco to the 
south of the river. Each fort was to have a stipulated squadron of resident 
soldiers ranging in number trom seventy to 0il~7hundred tifty. It was 
thought necessary to retain eighty soldiers in the fort of Lebo. fifteen on 
the estancia of Buena Esperanza. twelve in the tort ot San Pedro. fifty in 
'" ... the cities ot Conoepcion and Chillan. and one hundred in the lower city of 
Castro and the tort of Chiloe.10 These statistics illustrate the compar-
atively few armed torces required for detensive war. The primary utility of 
the fort of Angol had been to afford an advantageous stepping stone to 
further oftensive tactics; it was to be immediately diamantled while its 
population was to retire to an appointed place.ll Similarly it was 
unnecessary to preserve a fort in the province ot Tucapel. across the Paicsv! 
river, sinoe it too served as a springboard tor Spanish attaoks.12 On the 
other hand the fort ot Cuyuguano on the frontier of the cordillera nevada 
provided defense against hostile Indians as well as a shelter for friendly 
natives who had been reduced; therefore seventy soldiers were assigned as 
guards there. The fort ot Yumbel. situated in the vicinity ot unusually 
fertile tields. was to be a type ot agricultural supply house. For similar 
strategic reasons certain ot the other torts were retained. 
lOIbid •• 539-542. 
ll:rbid.# 538. 
l2IbId.. 538. 
-
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Another viceregal address to the president, oidores, and the royal 
Audiencia of Santiago exempted Valdivia from their jurisdiction.l3 In this 
document was the constant reiteration of the trust with which the king and 
the viceroy respected Valdivia's ability an~Prudence. The viceroy repeated 
the authority of Valdivia to abolish personal service, to procure peaceful 
settlement with the natives, and to administer the requirements of defensive 
~ . 
warfare. Further cedulas or provisions prohibited with the assurance of con 
sequent severe penalties for all transgressors of the law, the entrance of 
all the Spaniards except the padres into the Indian territory and pardoned 
the Indians for their misdoings in previous revolts.14 Any problem that 
should arise in the future was to be settled at the discretion of Valdivia 
who was now in complete civil and eoolesiastioal authority on the troubled 
Indian frontier of Chile. 
It is necessary at this point to review rapidly the situation of Chile 
during these days ot disoussion. The problem of the Araucanian had beoome 
annually more vexing. It became inoreasingly evident that this stook ot 
aborigines was not to be subdued as had been the natives in the other'sectim 
of the Amerioas. Chilean Spaniards were howling for revenge upon the 
traitorous Indian who dared defy enslavement. 
The royal Audienoia whioh had been surpressed thirty four years p~evious 
ly by an examiner who was a sort of colonial effioienoy expert, had been 
reestablished September 8, 1609 with the governor Garo!a RamOn as president. 
13Ibid., 543-544. 
l4Toledo, Historiadores, IV, 105-111. 
l5~., II, 481-482; Molina, II, 264. 
I 
Garo!a Ram~n had retained the governorship from 1605 when he had 
acoompanied Valdivia from Peru. As governor he had balanced his victories 
with his defeats. He was in violent disagreement with those who resorted 
to barbarous savagry in their treatment of ~~r victims; he sought rather 
to subdue with force since it appeared to him the only effective means to 
the end of pacifioation. In his treatment of the prisoners of war he had 
• displayed a lack of vindictiveness as well as a laok of mercy.16 His objec-
tion to the May 26, 1608 slavery eedula of the king illustrated his stand 
against the exploitation of the natives. yet he failed to comprehend the 
practioal utility of "guerra defensiva". He sinoerely opposed its prinoi-
pIes and practioes. Gentleness of this Christian interpretation was not his 
answer to the hostility of the Arauoanians. In his thoughts it seamed 
necessary to subjeot them by means of the sword before the sword could be 
placed permanently in the soabbard. Father Enrich points out that although 
..... 
Ramon did not request one Jesuit to aooompany his ar.my among the Arauoanians 
after Valdivia's 1605-1606 tour of inspeotion, he aooorded them oordiality 
and even generosity, not infrequently desiring them to aocept the hospitality 
of his residenoe in Arauco.17 The governor Ram6n had shown no disposition 
to dislodge the system of personal service. Technioally under his rule the 
encomendero was expeoted to subjeot a third of the number of his nativ~s to 
the extraction of gold. and should require eight months of intensive labor 
from eaoh servant, after Which the native should return to his pueblo for 
160livares, in Coleooi6n Historiadores, IV, 331-332. 
17Enrioh, I. 179. 
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two years and four months. lS Only a stipulated proportion of the natives of 
the vicinity were to be held in encomienda at the s~e time. Such proportiau 
were regarded as unimportant as the regulation to return the Indians to 
their lands. 
Upon Garcia Ramon's death in August, 1610, Dr. Luis Merlo de la Fuente, 
the gobierno interno, through a display of crushing severity continued the 
.. 
military operations of the late governor, attempting to effect rigid disai~ 
over his soldiers who were prone to treat him as a sUbstitute whose authority 
was of too short a duration of a duration to command respect.19 He repaired 
hastily to the frontier. 20 Nor did he waste any time in inciting the 
Araucanians to a new high in hostility. It was he who made known the terms 
of the August.26, l60S cedula of enslavement to the natives, disclosing the 
stipulations to Aillavilu, one of the most valiant Araucanian toquis, who 
made no effort to oonceal his heartfelt contempt for these words.2l Although 
Merlo de la Fuente was not a professional military man, he encouraged the .~ 
soldiers in their greed for the returns of the slave trade,_ 
On the 4th of December, 1610, the fifty year old army man, Captain JUaB 
Jar a quemada, set 8ail from Callao with two hundred men whom he had organized 
in Lima to assit the army in Chile.22 Arriving at the erstwhile promising 
oity ot Valparaiso on the first day of the new year, he was greeted by the 
. 
ominous evidence of depopulation.23 Nor was this to be his only disappoint-
18Amunategui y Solar, Historia Social de Chile, 41. 
19De la Fuente had spent over twenty years in the royal service in the Indies 
of Spain. He had been alcalde de corte in Lima and held various oommissions 
in Chile, Panama, Puertobelo and Cartajena. Finally he beoame oidor in the 
cabildo of Santiago. Barros Arana, Historia, IV, 1-8. 
20Ibid., 9-13. 
-
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mente Disorganization and oorruption had eaten far into the vitals of the 
army. Eight days later he wrote to the king urging h~ to retraot the 
oedula of May 26. 1608. and further requested a ban upon plaoing mUlatoes 
in the army as a punitive measure. 24 In ano~ letter he bemoaned the lack 
of military discipline; as one of his oomplaints he avowed that each 
spanish soldier required three Indians for his service and that six natives 
were forced to oarry a load suitable for fifteet or twenty horses. 2S Like 
aaro!a Ram6n, Jaraquamada hoped for correotion of abuses inflicted upon these 
paoified Indians yet he remained convinced that the sword was the sole tool 
of paoifioation. Since the enoomenderos held their slaves through a grant 
.; 
of the king, and thus were bound only by royal oedulas which they heeded or 
disregarded, aooording to their own personal interests. any attempt made by 
a military governor to reform abuses was ridiculed or ignored. To effeot a 
degree of improvement in the lot of the Indian auxiliaries Jaraquemada re-
..... quested the Provincial of the Jesuits who had arrived in Santiago that Janu-
ary, to dispatch two padres to Arauco where they were needed to assist the 
natives and the Spanish soldiers who were degenerating deeper in the mire of 
moral laxity.26 
The comparative quiet of the year 1611 may be aooounted for by the fact 
that it was quite impossible to oonsider further hostile entradas among. the 
21Actas ~ Cabildo ~ Santiago. in Co1eooi6n Historiadores. XXV. 194-198. 
22Barros Arana, ~. cit., IV, 15-20. 
23Enrioh. I, l80~81;--
24Claudio Gay, Historia II, 234-244. 
25Ibid., 234-244. 
26Enrioh. I, 181. 
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Indians until some military discipline should have been established in the 
Spanish troops. During this year Jaraquemada was busily concerned with the 
reorganization of his foroes. This same year the toqui Aillavi16 departed 
from his mortal existenoe leaving the ArauoaQi'ans under a new general toqui. 
The presenoe onoe more of padres along the frontier had mitigated in some 
small degree the maltreatment of the oaptive Indians • 
• This peaoe, or rather interim in war during whioh further attaoks were 
planned, was rudely shattered by the revolt of the natives in the February 
of 1612. The natives of Arauoo, Tuoapel, and Catiray staged a bloody in-
surreotion. Houses were burned and Spaniards slain. Retiring to their 
hinterland the natives prepared for outright war. 27 , Concepcion, so near the 
Bfo-Bfo, was enveloped in oonsternation at this new turn of events. The 
natives as far north as the rio Maule were evidenoing a restlessness. 
Amid the spirit of hostility whioh was liable again to mature into a 
reality of ruination, Valdivia and the new governor, Ribera, arrived.28 
With Chile vibrating under her diffioulties, the Jesuits were alread~ 
beooming aware of inoreasing ill will of oertain of their opposers. The 
battle waged against personal enslavement was, of oourse, not based upon the 
27Toledo, in Coleooion de Historiadores, IV, 132; Rosales, II, 606-610. 
28Though the friends of-gpvernor Jaraquemada had requested that he be aflowed 
to remain in offioe during the initiation of the plan of guerra defensiva, 
padre Valdivia had expressed his preferenoe for Alonso de Ribera. Rosales, 
~ ~., II, 646. In Ribera's appointment whioh he received in Tuoaman 
the go-vernor was directed to establish peaoe at onoe. Yet Ribera suffered 
at this time from an injury which prevented his mounting a horse; therefore 
his arrival at Santiago was delayed from January until Maroh 27. On Janu-
ary 28.1612. Jaraquemada wrote that Ribera was foroed to travel by means 
ef a hand barrow, and that for the rest of his life he oould mount a horse 
only with the most painful difficulty; the follOwing year. Ootober 30. 1613 
Captain Diego Flores de .Leon wrote to the king of this same handioap-
I 
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per.onal theory of Valdivia, but was founded upon the basio prinoiples ot 
Christianity. Therefore, upon this subjeot of personal service there could 
be no compromise; it had been olearly displayed by the Chilean encomenderos 
that the .y.tem was one of en.lavement. A. ~ most vooiferous denounoer. 
of these oonditiona, the Jesuits a. a group were the butt of the growing 
opposition of the soldiers and the enoomenderol. 
In 1608 the Jesuits had been deprived of .tat may appear a minor prerog-
ative, but may also be regarded as the initial deprivation in a series of 
lesser perseoutions Whioh eventually oulminated in the expulsion of the 
Sooiety. The bishop of Santiago, Fray Juan ptrez de Espinosa, who never AilS 
to snatoh an opportunity to express hi. aversion towards the Sooiety, and 
who had been unimpressed by Diego de Torres, provinoial of Chile, in his 
attempts at reconoiliation. had prohibited the padres from preaching in their 
ohurohes on feast days on the grounds that they should permit the people to 
attend the cathedral. 29 In answer to his report of this unneoessary r.8tri~ 
tion. the General, Aquaviva, reminded Torres that the Jesuits had suffered 
impediments in the proseoution of their duties hitherto; h. added that since 
suffered by the governor. Barros Arana. Historia, IV, 44. Actas ~ Cabildc 
de Santiago, in Coleocion Historiadores. XXIV, 302-305. 
29Astrain, IV, 684. Medtna recalls that during his bishoprio Fray Espinosa 
managed to quarrel " ••• eon todo el mundo, oon los oidores y oon sus 
clerigos, y qeu al fin ooncluyo porabondonar su diooesis • irse esoapado a 
Sevilla." Biblioteoa Hispano-Chilena, I, 183. 
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.' the oause tor such aotion was beyond interpretation, the only course would 
be submission in silence. SO 
Aside from this brunt ot personal antipathy was the more understandable 
opposition of the encomenderos, who were bec9~ng aware ot the growing 
.~ 
prestige of these padres among the natives. In the truned Jesuit Paraguayan 
reductions, Where the padres had segregated the natives trom the exploitation 
of the Spaniards, there was a vivid warning to~he encomenderos ot the possUW 
menaoe to their economy which the padres might etfect. 3l 
Torres related to Aquaviva, February 15, 1612, the struggle of the 
Jesuits against personal service, regretting the enforoed labor of the 
Indians and their separation trom their homes and their inability under such 
oonditions to progress t-.porally or spiritually.32 He added that the 
official regulations which abolished such abuses on paper, and the exhortatkn 
of the priests, were woefully disregarded. 
With great hope and satisfaction Torres greeted Valdivia, Whose zealou. 
labors he had always admired33 Not only was the stand of the Society against 
personal service opposed by the soldier and encomendero, but it was also met 
30padre Aquaviva wrote, "Pena nos ha dado la diterencia que en Santiago de 
Chile ha habido oon e1 Obispo, y no puede dejar de redundar en impedimento 
de nuestros ministerios el impedirnas predioar en nuestra iglesia por el 
coamino con que 10 ba tomado, y no sabamas que sea buen remedio pasar por 
ello tonien silencio, como algunos nos escriben, no sin alg~ sentimiento. 
Aca nos ha parecido que se podria tomar otro acuerdo, yes, que no temanana 
las fiestas, cuando se predica en la Catedral, que nuestra iglesia dejaria 
de ser trecuentada ni las almas defraudadas del seistento esperitual de los 
Nuestros." Astrain, IV, 684. 
31Ibid., 684. 
32Pastells, I, 146-151. 
33Ibid., I, 200, 203-201 • 
.......... 
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by the denunciations of those who were convinced of the futility of attempt-
ing conversion of these heathen souls. 34 To them such gentle or humane 
methods of pacifioation as advooated by Valdivia bespoke an inability to 
faoe the reality of the situation. Under tAo!. delusion created by the men c£ 
the sword many clerics opposed the work of Valdivia and the Jesuits. There 
is the striking example of Fray Jer6ntmo de Hinojosa, a Dominican of notable 
.. 
prestige and a former oompanion of Garo!a Ram6'n, who arrived in Lima as a 
. 
representative of the oities of Chile in order to dissuade the viceroy from 
continuing to sanction "guerra defensiva" and the suppression of personal 
servioe. 35 In the presenoe of the Vioeroy and audiencia he deolared his in-
tention to act contrary to the regulations given Valdivia; more thoroughly 
to express disapproval he added that at least in the oity of Conoepoion the 
aabildo and a junta of all the leading personages had expressly denied that 
there was sufficient oause to adopt the p1an. 36 Another faotor oondusive 
of rabid opposition to guerra defensiva was pride in military achievement; 
espeoia1ly did the blood of oapitanas simmer at the ban plaoed upon agrassion 
Such an order savored too strongly of an admission that military pursuits, 
had been unsuooessful. Nor did the soldier wax too enthusiastic over the 
rigid restrictions the padres placed against tmmorality.31 
On May 13, 1612, Valdivia disembarked at Penco intending to oontin~e 
toward Concepcion. Shortly afterwards his companions joined him.38 Accomp~ 
~arros Arana, Historia, IV, 40-41. 
35Ibid., IV, 38. 
36Toledo, in Coleccion Historiadores, IV, 106. 
37Amunategui-So1ar, Las Encomiendas, I, 380. 
38During the journey from Callao the boats had been .parated and thus Padre 
Valdivia arrived a few days before his companions. Barros Arana, Risteria 
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ir;.t~ }-:im wero fi V8 Ar'3.u0!1.ni'3.ns who had been rele:'tsed from bondage as the 
111it19.1 evidence of Valdivia's a.bolition of nativ3 enslavement. Torres~ at 
that time in Santiago~ dispatohed a. mes3age to Valdivia offering !1im the 
scrviee of three additional padres skilled ~1i.;7+;he Araucanian tongue and 
.fs.;llili<!.r Vlit:l the lr:l,nds. 39 Valnivift lost no time in presenting his c1"9don-
. ' 
.l:i'118 to the cabildo of ConcepcHon, vfhera he received formnl though insin-
.. 
ccr0 Bssurance of their cooperation. 40 The padr9 sent word immediately to 
the superintendents of the regiments and the captains on the frontiers for-
:d,:1:Hng further entradas into Indian territory and demanding that mercy be 
b';)stOYled those natives s.lready taken captive. 41 Valdivia concluded his 
officilll preliminaries during his eoni'srsnc3es with governor Ribera and 
3ishop Espinosa. 42 
Seven days after their arriv9.l in ConcepciO"n Valdivia. accompg.nied by 
his friend Hno companion Father Gaspar Sobrino~ as well as by five liberated 
... " 
natives from PeFu~ headed for the Bio-Bio. Four leagues from ConcepciO'n 
.... 
'1nd two from the fort of Sa.n Pedro they met one of the princip9.1 toquis ~ 
:::oronel by l1ar:J.0~ who expren36d g;r,:::at joy upon seeing the padrds. 43 That 
s'>.me night they baptizod five adulb (of whom four Wt;;re over eighty years 
of age) and three children. 44 
IV~ 44. Astr0.in, IV, 714. says that upon his arrivs.l in Concepcion' 
Valdivia ViaS aclmitted i::lto tIle Jesllit r(;)sidence there. Valdivia says that 
he and :b.is comp.nions were accorcen the hospi'tality of' the Dominicans in 
Concepcion. Luis de Valdivia, S.J.~ Relacion de 10 gve svcedio ~ el 
Reyno_ 16 Ghile despues .9. 111 Padr\? Luys de Vald:'via, ~ 19. COlil,P"l.ni'3. de 
.. Iesvs entr:) ~ & ~ fus ~ comps.l1cr:l.s Sacerdot3s, l612~ 2. 
,)gEnri':,}h~ I" 240. 
40Ibid.,. I~ 244. 
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J. Rosales~ II~ 548. Padre Vs.ldi"lia founded the college of Concepcion in l,<a.y 
1512. Oliv9.res, in Col'3'Jci6n Histori!J.dore3~ VII~ 152-157. 
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~1·'.J!l.-+;i0r. IJatives were dispat.::hed to the interior to announe,,, the new plan 
of Sp9in to the vt:trious toquis. In less than five days after his a.rriv9.1 
in ArallCO Valdivio. was visited by Indians ffJ)~ Pengeregua, Millar:::tpoe, 
~uido, Q,ui!1po, Lauapie, Leuo, Taulero, Colcurs. and Arauco; natives had come 
to 3 ee what faith they could put in the rumors of' p98. cs from :.101~uilli, 
" .... Lincoya, Pilmayquen, Tucapel, PQycavi, Angoli;lo, Tolcu".'llmo, Cavucupil e.nd 
lli:mra. 45 
Meanwhile Valdivia bad reedv6c ratters from Ribera with further royal 
p1'0Ji:si,:ms Rttasting the povlers of the ~dre. Parsimonious with hi:, time 
flJll:J'"lg the natives Valdi'iTia considered it suffi,:}ient to have Sabrino attend 
to this rn.B,tter in Conc~pciO'n in his steado46 
Heartened by the indiMtions of inter;;::;'!; the Indians had displayed, 
unr'ler the :sale prot'3ction of friendly natives he journeye1 throughout Arauco 
ann. Tucapel. 47 Immer1iats W8.8 hH success among the reducc::l Indians who hacf' 
b,:;;::;':1 dangcr"(Jusly restless since a revolt the preyious February. The pi-dre 
lent a patient ear to their :raul tituurc of grievances. /. Announ(~illg the cedulas 
of' "':he king to them, he offared assuro.nce thu"': their ~'6gl'avations ',vould I 
C08.Se. lJative C1.'l.c:qut::G had been sent by ·i~11iYia to announCi'; the new policy 
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to the toquis in Catiray.48 While awaiting a reply he found it necessary to 
return to Concepci~n to confer with Ribera. 49 The day after he lert. five 
cr six ar.med cac1ques who had been advised of the proferred peace. arrived 
on the other side of the Bro-B{o from Arauoo. ',Mistaking them for hostile 
.. 47 
natives, the maestre de campo Alvaro Nunez went out to meet their challenge 
but found them concerned only with the verification of the reports dissemin-
ated through their lands concerning peace.50 
Upon Valdivia's return five cac!ques from Catiray came to him desirous 
of investigating these same reports. In order to establiSh oomplete oon-
fidence in his good will, Valdivia. acoompanied by but two soldiers, one 
sagaciOUS Indian from Lima and three toquis of !rauco, departed for the 
treacherous land of war in Catiray.5l Arriving the first night of their 
journey at Longonabal. they were received by eight Indians on horseback. who 
reciproacted the friendliness of the padre.52 Plans were made fOr a conven-
tion of the most important toquis from the vicinity which would take plaoe .~ 
Nancu. near Catiray. The padre attended this junta, aooompanied by Captain 
Pinto. "with cinamon branch in their hands." the symbol of peace.53 Here 
the ten reguas of TalcamAvida, Pirenmahuida. Colunbueno, Quileno. Tas1evo, I 
Ilicura, Lebo. Arauco, Pilumrehue and Curalevo were represented.54 For 
eight hours the junta wended its loquacious way. Valdivia exposed the prin-
48Toledo, in Coleccion Historiadores. IV. 134. 
49Barros Arana, HIstoria, IV, 49. 
50Toledo. in Colecci6n de Historladores, IV, 134. 
51Valdivia, Relac16n, 1€r.r2. 5. ----
52Ibid., 5; Toledo, IV, 136-137; Rosales, II, 549. 
53Th'is" symbol is expressed, "con un ramo de canelo en las man os. " 
54Valdlvia. Relacion ~. ~., 6; Toledo, IV, 139. 
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eiples of the plan, illustrating its advantages. He promised them that 
they would receive justice from the Spaniards. He reminded the natives of 
his position as a dual ambassador. First, he was the ecolesiatioal repre-
sentative, in which capacity he had preached.tR the Spaniards in order to 
remind them of their Christian obligations and the wrongs they were inflict-
ing upon the natives. He recalled the faot that Christ had not died upon the 
cross for the preservation o~ Spaniards exclusfvely, but for all mankind. 
Thus the Arauoanians were equal in the sight of the Lord and on that account 
in the sight of his ministers. Sinoe the king desired that the principles 
of Christ be praotised he had commanded the oessation of aggressive war and 
the abolition of personal service, desiring only that the natives share in 
the fruits of Christianity.55 Thus the king had appointed a new governor al 
so, with instructions to live peaoefully within the Spanish territory. Only 
in self defense would the Spaniards fight. 
Carampangui, the prinoipa1 cac!que, expressed an inclination to coope 
with the padre. He appreciated the exposition of this type of peace which 
differed so radically from previous offers of the Spaniards, but said they 
would oonsider an agreement of pacification only should they be permitted to 
5&,Much oonfusion exists among the various historians ooncerning the exact 
proceedings of many of these juntas attended by Valdivia; thus it is to 
Valdivia's own accounts that one should turn for more aoourate details 
of the treatings. Valdivia wrote extensive relations of the year 1612 whi 
have been photographed by the Massaohusetts Historioa1 Sooiety. Re1aci~n 
de 10 qve svcedio en el Reyno de Chile df:2ues q e1 Padre LU~S de =Valcliuia. 
de E ~e8Ma de resii' entro en !! ~ S oohO' com aneros acerdotes.2!. 
ra mif'ma ompan"'Ya, e1 ano de 1~2, describesthe' success 0 the system 
Uiitil becember 14, mr. lrel.iCIOn de 10 S!!. svcedio en 1a jornada qve 
hizimos e1 senor Prefidente A10Dio de RIbera Gournador-d87te Reyno,~~ 
defde lrauoo a Payeaui, a oocluyr 1aspazes de Elicura, ultima refua de 
~oape1 1. ~ ~ Pueren Z ~ ImperW covers the period from Maro , 16r2 to 
I 
treat with the Spaniards as an independent nation. He admitted that the 
peaceful settlement of the war then seventy years in duration would be wel-
come. Also before peace could be concluded certain evils would have to be 
rectified and certain reforms assured. Tbt'~irst wrong damanding redress 
would necessitate the returning of the Indians Who, seized along the border, 
had been shipped away from their native soil. 5E It was agreed that a 
.. 
reciprocal arrangement for the return of Spaniards and Indians was highly 
desireable. The toqul demanded that the cedulas of the king be enacted 
justly, and that in the future those cac!ques guilty of violations of the 
agreement be judged and punished in their own territories. 57 Carampangui 
added that, since the Spaniards disavowed intentions of further aggression, 
the fort of San Geronimo, valued essentially as a foothold tor assault upon 
the natives, was unnecessary. When the padre hinted that he preferred to 
consult with military authorities in regard to dismantling the fort a mur-
murring ot discontent at the evasion arose. Valdivia hastily assured them, 
in the name of his Majesty, that the fort would be quitted.58 
From this assembly Valdivia returned to Santiago where he informed the 
audiencia of the fortunate beginnings he had witnessed.59 From there he 
went to the fort of Talcamahuyda where the governor had come from Concepcion 
December 24. 1612. This was sent to his brother in Lima. Re1acion de la 
muerte de los ~dres escrita ~ el Padre Valdiula a 24 de Diziembre de---
iiiil sfsC1eiitOs 1. ~!!. padrelTOvincia! de !:!!!:. is 'S'8lfexp 1 ana tor yin 
It"St tie. It is to these three reiationsthit oonstant reference must be 
made to clarify obscurities in the narrators concerning this year of 1612. 
56valdivia, Relacion ~e ~ ~ ~dio !P ~ ReYAo~ •• , 7-8. 
57Ibid •• 7-8. 
5Si'6!d., 8-9. 
59T.hiS first encounter with the Araucanians in the negotiations for peaoe 
took place during the middle of June. The Te Deum was sung in the Churches 
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and where Catirayan toquis. among whom was Carampangui. had assembled to 
treat for peace. They were aocorded the ceremonious hospitality they deemed 
suitable to chiefs of their dignity. Reassurance was given the Indians by 
the governor that Padre Valdivia was fully.~horized to materialize all the 
promises he had made. and that the padre should be given the full cooperatio 
of the governor •. Gratified. the toquis returned to their lands with favor-
.. 
able reports concerning their negotiations with the S:paniardse 60 
Padre Gaspar Sobrino had rejoined Valdivia. The two worked out further 
steps towards the pacifioation of the Araucanians. Twelve influential toquis 
with three of the for.mer oaptives from Peru were commissioned to the land 
of Puren to hearld the new peaoe. 61 In reply Valdivia received numerous 
requests for a personal visit. He complied with these requests. attempting 
to lay the foundations of solid friendship and understanding. He sent 
letters as far south as Chilo," and the city of Chlllan where numerous hostile 
... 
Indians added an element of constant i~seourity.62 Conourrently he had initi 
ated hopeful treatings with the towuis of Ilioura. 63 "Guerra defensiva" 
appeared to be aooomplishing what "g~erra ottensiva" had tailed to do tor 
over seventy years. 
ot Santiago and solemn mass oelebrated in thanksgiving tor this initial 
suooess. Astrain. IV. 716-717. 
6Ovaldivia. Re1aoion de 10 qve svoedio en el Reyno •••• 10. 
61Toledo. in Colecoi6~Hi-sitOi1Ladores. rV;I35. 
62Va1divia. Relaoion !!!. ~ qv. svoedio ~!!. Reyno de Chile •••• 10. 
63Ibid •• 11. 
-
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CHAPTER V 
REVERTION TO UNOFFICIAL "GUERRA 
OFFENSIVA" 
. 
. .. " 
By August general grumblings of discontent at the lack of activity were 
beooming louder and more foroeful. The military element was impatient to 
resume its more hazardous and profitable perfo~noes. Nor was the bishop 
content to see Valdivia exercise suoh authority, regardless of his aocomplish 
ments. l To carryon his work most effectively Valdivia had established two 
missions - one at Monterrey, the other at Arauco.2 He had received the 
assistance promised him by the Provinoial, Torres. The padres Horaoio Veohi 
and Martin (le Aranda were sent to Arauco lIhere. to their surprise they found 
not hostile infidels, but pacified natives desirous of further instruotion 
in the Faith. 3 At the same time Valdivia sent Father Vicente Modolell and 
Antonio de Aparicio to Monterrey. The initial efforts here were 8ucoessful~ 
Accompanied by soldiers and by many ambassadors from Ilicura and from Puren 
who had urged a conferenoe with the father, Valdivia again took leave of 
Arauco. While on their way to a place appointed. for a junta. Valdivia re-
ceived numerous messages fram the natives, all indicating hope of peaoeful 
negotiations. 5 
lValdivia, Relaci6n de 10 .9:!! svcedio en el fiynO de Chile ••• , 12. 
2Ovalle, Historioa ReraCfoilCfel Reino dii-ch e. in-Coleocion Historiadores, 
XIII, 109. --
3Rosales, II. 560-561. 
4Ibid •• II, 561. 
5LiiIS de Valdivia, S.J., Relacion ~ ~ qv. svcedio ~.!!. journada qve 
hizimos el senor Prefidente Alonfo de Ribera Gournador defta Arauco a Pay~ 
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Among those who sought Valdivia travelling to Paicav! were Indians of 
Leuo, Lincoye and Pangue (two leagues from Paicav!) who were similarly 
interested in verifying the rumor of the regal proclamations Which were said 
to be announced by Padre Valdivia. 6 One In~~ toqui from Catiray, 
Lebulican, journeyed to San Geronimo to voice his suspioions of the Spanish 
generosity, making no effort to dissemble his strenuous attempts to stir his 
.. people against peaoeful treatings with untrustworthy intruders. 7 Six toquis 
cwme from Puren (from the reguas of the ooast - Ralommo, Calcuimo, Tirga, 
Claroa, Videregua, Lleulleu, and Ragaloe) with others from the reguas of 
Puren and from Ynauillo and Pillaguen to inform the padre of their inolina-
tion to believe sagacious the distrust of Lebulioan. Other toquis of Ilioura 
alligned themselves with those of Puren, and similarly many of the Aylla 
regua of Tuoapel. Valdivia saw that he would have to work assiduously to 
dispel this deserved distrust founded upon seventy years of Spanish duplicity. 
While this negative s~nttment was being voiced, Llacanague, the prinoipal 
toqui of Molloco, and the Toqui General of the province of the Cordillera 
Nevada, arrived from Pur en to conclude a peaoeful agreement, with the stipu-
lation that the fort of Angol be quitted.8 Thus was Valdivia in a position 
requiring most delioate taot, an attribute he utilized far more readily 
among the natives than among the sons of Spain. 
! colluY!" ~ pazes ~ Elicura, ultima regua l..!!:!. ~ Pueren l. ~ Imperial, 
13. 
6Ibid., 14. 
7Ibid., 14. 
8Th'I'd., 14. 
-
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Within the next three weeks a situation developed which though a 
a patchwork was a cUlmination of many diverse events and elements. Tureulipe 
a native toqui who had been held as a prisoner of war since his capture in 
1611 by Don Alonso de Quesada. had recently.a.t off his shaokles of bondage. 
His narrations of his painful oaptivity. his orations against any trust being 
placed in the Spaniard. his derision towards the mediation of Valdivia • 
.. 
carried weight among his people.9 So potent an influence did he exert that 
he was able to lead several toquis of Catiray as well as a goodly host of 
natives in an attack against Arauco. Not only did the Spanish forces suc-
cessfully resist the assault. but the irate toqui was again taken prisoner. 
He finally consented to treat with the padre. who deoided it would be best 
to dispatch an ambassador to the toquis of Catiray with generous peace 
offers. IO The s~e messenger was to contact the other toquis of Puren and 
Imperial to arrange for peaoe negotiations. Meanwhile Ribera and an impres-
sive regiment entered Puren to watch for a movement that might change this 
stage of indicision to one of war. 
The noted belligerent toqui of Puren, Anganamon. agreed to sit in at 
a conference.ll Valdivia and his companion Sobrino were accompanied by the 
two padres from the mission of Arauoo, Vecchi and Aranda. to Paicav! where 
they waited the arrival of Anganamon.12 Nor were they long in waiting •• With 
9 Rosales, II. 559. 
lOIbid., II. 559. 
llDon Vicente Carvallo i Goyeneche, Descripcion Historico Geografica ~ 
Reino de Chile, in Coleccion Historiadores, VITI, 296. 
Rosales. II, 561-562. 
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a guard of forty soldiers and with several ulmenes, Anganamon brought 
numerous Spanish prisoners whom he liberated hoping to reoeive a similar ges-
ture from the Spaniards. He was reoeived not only by the padres but by the 
governor and the prinoipal officers who discussed possible terms of peaoe.13 
.. 47 
Inoluded in the necessary prerequisites was the establishment of the R{o 
B{o-B!o as a barrier between the two nations, permitting only the padres to 
oross into Indian territory. To all external a~pearances Anganamon was 
deeply impressed by Padre Valdivia's sermon on the possibilities of accom-
plishment through "guerra defensiva" and on the necessity of preparing in 
this life for a life atter death. Arrangements were made for the exchange 
of prisoners of war (among whom were Don Alonso Quesada and Tureu1ipi); plans 
were formulated for a general junta of peace. 14 Anganamon had requested the 
evaouation of the forts of Paioav1and of Arauco as essential provisions in 
a peace settlement; the first was promised without reservation, and the 
second was to be accomplished after the negotiations had come to a detinite~ 
conclusive peace.15 
Anganamon departed. Meanwhile three of his wives, a Spanish woman 
Dona Maria de Jarquera and two Indians, with two of his children, escaped 
to the fort of paicav!.16 Anganamon upon hearing of this communicated 
l2Rosales, II, 561-562. 
l3Mo1ina, II, 267. 
l4Rosales, II, 563; Carvallo i Goyeneohe, in Co1eccion Historiadores, VIII, 
292. 
l5Molina, II, 268; It was decided later to wait until the conolusion of this 
general junta before commencing the demolition of Paicav!. Barros Arana, 
Historia, IV, 57. 
l6Molina, II, 268-269; Carvallo i Goyeneche, in Co1eccion Historiadores, 
VIII, 297-298. 
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immediately with the Spaniards. As he was impatiently awaiting a reply, a 
meeting of theologians and jurists convened to settle the difficulty.17 The 
question was a vexing one. On the one hand was the inadvisability of with-
holding what to the toqui and the untutored !a.lage was Anganamon's rightful 
property. To further complicate matters, the Spanish woman was a Christian 
while the other two Indian women and one daughter were either baptized or 
had expressed a desire for baptism. To return~hese Christian women to the 
polygamous toqui would be a violation of the principles of Christianity; to 
return the converted daughter would expose her to an atmosphere of barbarous 
paganism. An astonishing number of military men became indignantly rightous 
over this matter of upholding the Christian ethics. It was deoided that 
Anganamon be given his choice among his wives, be reduced to Christianity, 
and contract a legal marriage in the Church. Such a decision was sent to . 
the infidel chief, who understood only that these Christian Spaniards were 
refusing to return his property.18 Especially was he provoked over the re-~ 
fusal of the Spaniards to return both his daughters, instead ot promising 
just the eldest who had not beenoonverted to the faith of the Christians. l9 
Meanwhile. another series of incidents oooured which revived hope of a 
satisfactory peaoe negotiation. There came to Valdivia the septagenarian 
utiflame, a toqui of import, who hitherto had been among the most rabidly 
. 
roused against the Spaniards. 20 Now restraining the hatred he felt, he had 
l7Ibid., VIII, 297. 
l~., VIII, 297-299. 
19Moiina, II, 268-269; Rosales, II, 370-371. 
20Molina, II, 268. Valdivia, RelaoioD;, ~ ~ qve sucedio ~ ~ jornada que 
hizimos ••• , 15. 
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oome to the padre seeking the release of his son who had been taken oaptive 
by the Spaniards. Valdivia's gentle treatment of the toqui and his meroy 
in granting the request so touohed the haughty ohief that he altered his 
judgment of the Spaniards. 21 He turned his ~Qwers of influenoe from stirr-
ing bloody wrath against the intruders to mediation between his people of 
Ilioura and the Spaniards. 
Valdivia met seventy leaders with an impre·ssive number of toquis from 
Ilioura. 22 Quiok to follow the example of their neighbors from Ilioura. 
numerous toquis of Puren joined in this cooperation with the efforts for 
peace. 23 So it was that Valdivia and the governor witnessed a peaoeful con-
gregation oomposed largely of reoently most rabid enemies of the Spaniards. 
Striking the keynote of the discussion Utaflame delivered an oration warmly 
advooating peaceful settlement. 24 He asked the Spaniards to quit the tort 
of Paioav~. and to send padres to his oountry to evangelize his people. while 
excluding the military and oivil men wnose entradas. regardless of their 
intention. still kindled suspioion in the minds of the natives. He urged. 
cognizant of the bitterness the inoident was provoking. that more lenient 
terms be granted Anganamon. and that the Spaniards dispense with all delays 
in returning at least the daughters. With the promise that the fort would be 
quitted without undue proorastination, Valdivia further agreed with Ut~flame 
2lIbid., 15. 
22IbId., 15. 
23Ibid., 16. 
24;Ibid., 16. 
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that Anganamon should not be antagonized beyond endurance, though Christian 
stand~rds could not be forsaken. Valdivia favored dispatching word to 
Anganamon announcing the immediate return of his eldest daughter, and ex-
plaining the motives behind the apparent Sp~3.~h injustioe. WHh an excha~ 
of promises to continue these preliminaries to permanent pence, the remark-
a'!:Jle junta which, due to the Black Robes, witnessed words instead of war be-
.. 
tween the erstwhile most murderous enemies, drew to a close. 25 
That night, December 7, 1612, an atmosphere of unrest hovered over 
camp. The officers were disgruntled. Valdivia prayed for many hours during 
the night that he might act prudently.26 The following day he announoed the 
demolition of Paicavl should begin at once; he prepared to send two padres 
to seek out Anganamon in order to make the explanations discussed the day 
before, and in order to comply with the requests for padres made by the 
toquis of Puren. 27 Work began immediately upon the destruction of the fort 
... 
of Paicavl. Ribera retired to Arauco with his army; Valdivia remained in th 
,.. 
fort of Lebu, which after the demolition of Paicavf served as the most use-
ful outpost on the new line' of frontier. 28 
Fears were ennunciated concerning the intended entrance of the padres 
into this land so recently rebellious against all things and persons 
Spanish. Such fears had been expressed before. Despite the oPPositiop 
25Ibid., 17-19; Rosales, II, 378. 
26Bar:ros Arana, Historia IV, 59. 
27Ibid., IV, 59. 
28I bid., IV, 65. Barros Arana says that at this time Ribera and his 
captains knew of rebellious activities of the Indians of Catiray who were 
donning their costumes of war, but that they were forced to remain in the 
background since they wore held to their commands, adding sarcastically, 
"Por eso el gobernador i sus capitanes que oonocian las condiciones i el 
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.' Valdivia deemed it wisest to comply with the requests of the toquis from 
Ilicura and from Puren lest an evasion of the opportunity result not only 
in the loss of countless souls but 16st the Indians be aroused to doubt the 
good faith of the padres. Barros Arana has .re£erred to the entrada of the 
.. "7 
padres as "utter folly".29 He failed to take several factors into account: 
1) the harvesting of souls of the infidels was the primary mission of the 
padres in the New World; 2) such an undertakitg necessitated obvious risks, 
though proportionately rarely did these risks result in the obtaining of the 
crown of martyrdom. 3) Valdivia had exposed himself upon numerous occa-
sions during the preceeding years and had developed a sense of security 
midst the natives despite the warnings of the Spaniards. ~bile the crown of 
martyrdom was an honor devoutly desired, fruitless perilous missions were 
not undert!3.ken to attain the glory. It had always been the policy of the 
Jesuits to seek to live for their Faith, rather than to seek death for it.30 
The padres Vecchi and Aranda and the hanaano ooadjutor Diego de 
Iv:ontalban were selected for this dangerous mission. 3l Accompanying them was 
estado social de los indios mucho major que el rei de Espana, que el 
virrei del Peru i que los padres jesuitas, no tenian fe alguna en aquellas I 
paces; pero estaban obligados a obedecer, las ordenes superiores que habian 
recivido." Ibid., IV, 60. 
29I bid., IV, 63-65. 
30The sixteenth and seventeenth oentury knew a zeal difficult for the 
nineteenth or twentieth century mind to oomprehend. So earnestly desired 
was martyrdom tr.a.t many a religious oonstantly prayed for it as a token 
of God's love. Countless instances could be ennmnerated wherein this orav 
ing for the crown of martyrdom led to an unnecessary exposure to danger. 
The Jesuit Generals const8.ntly warned ags,inst such misdirected zeal since 
their numbers wer~ few when compared with the magnitude of the tasks they 
undertook. 
3lVa l divia, Relaoion de ~ muerte de los padres escrita por el Padre Valdiull 
December 24, 1612. 
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the influential Utiflame and the toqui Paineguil. 32 
Anganamon was in a ravage mood. Upon hearing of the prosence of the 
padres within the lands of Ilicura., with one hundred Indians of Pellabuen 
he descended upon them, slaying the group W\~ijput awaiting an explanation of 
their mission. 33 
Those in opposition to "guerra defensiva" had been awaiting just one 
indication of possible failure. This was it. ·The protestations of the 
caciques of Puren and Ilicura that this ~rime was not of their doine - in-
deed not even the hundred who had followed Angana:non in this murdering were 
from their ranks - fell upon deaf ears. The military men and the encomen-
deros were little concerned with the fact the. t sufficient proof for their 
protestation was offered. 34 Valdivia and "guerra. defensiva" were branded 
failures. The Society was held responsible for allowing the execution of 
this system which culminated in the outrageous slaying of the Jesuits and 
friendly toquis. 
Revenge was demanded. Forgotten was the fact that within the short 
period of eight months under the direction of Valdivia peace had been estab-
lished among the recent rebels of Arauco, among the inhabitants of Catiray 
who had been most fierce in their opposition, and those of :Monterrey who had 
previously displayed successful resistance to all military force. For-
gotten were all the toquis of Puren and Ilicura, save Anganamon whom they 
32Ibid., 21. 
33Ibid., 21-22. Matias Tanner, S.J., Societas ~ usque ad sanqu~l11"n ~ 
vitae profusionem militans ~ Europa, Africa, et America, contra ~ntiles 
"ma.hometanos, judacos, hereticos, impios .E!.£. Deo, Fide, oecclesia, pieta, 
te sive vita, et ~ sorum, ~ ~ Societate Jesu in causa Fidei et vir-
tutis propugnatae violente. morta toto orbe sublati sunt, Rome, 1665, 464. 
I 
.' 
.... ypif:iGd as tho nativE: j iL,norec W0re thl: ccdula~ viLi,;:;h still 8.uttorizod 
::1;", sp-::civ.l civil, military, and ecclesiasticf.'l autt.ority of VO.l,:I,iv:s. Once 
I:.()re the Spanicrds revertcc to the tactics wLj,ch had proven futile for over 
seventy yeB,rs. Governor Ribera soon discarded the qualities attributed to 
~~;:::e vindictive 3pirit Fosssssec by the illttjOri":y of the military element. 
In a lette;r to the king m'Ylediately after the martyrdoms, Ribera pointed to 
.. 
~~he crime of Anganamon as Certa in evidence of the f'3ilure of "guerra defen-
That the intrinsic ~lt1e of a system cannot be d.etermined by a single 
incident would seem pure and axicmatic logic. Valdivia and the Jesuits 
repeatedly reminded the populace that this one defest sllstajned in the 
,Jesuit martyrdoms should assume no s ignifican0t: of import when it was con-
tre,sted with tho numercus and constantly increasing successes of' the system 
/ ,; 
of "guerra defens iva" soutt: of the Bio-Bio. The soldiers and encornenderos, 
... 
eager to draw their swords and fill their purses, were deaf to such reason-
ing. Innumerable atts.cks were made upon the Indians, provoking them to for-
sake hope of negotiation. 37 Before the year of 1613 drew to a close the 
governor had direoted twenty-two military expeditions. 37a Anganamon gra.sped 
his opportunity in these hostile Spanish entradas to vindic~:'<te r.is actions 
<tnd to persuade m.e.uy of th e Indians of Im.perial to forswear what allegiance 
The martyrdom's occured December 14, 1612. The bodies of the Jesuits were 
buried at Lebu. 
34Valdi via, Re1a cion de 1:!. muerte i! ~ Eadres, 21-2~. 
35Gay, I, 269-272; Astrs.in, IV, 725-726. 
36Vedina, Bibliotcca lIisp'.no-Chiltma, I, 184-185. 
372osnles, II, 592-593. 
37B:'lillahos, Grr.ndezas de Ind:;'as (. Zstado Eclesi:3stico, Politico:L ~fili.J:;e.r 
de ":\l!,.~rica, in-COlo~ion IIistoriador'J~, Y..xI:~, 20. 
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ttey he.d begun to develop toward the SpaniEl.rds. Both the na,tions of 
Imperia,l and of Puren were pitcbed to new depths of r_atred and dis'trus't of 
the Spania.rds. 38 Fow were the natives of the more friendly frontiE:;rs of 
Talcamavida and Araueo spared injus'tice, but w.ere also the butt of the 
.. 47 
belligerent soldier. 39 
Valdivia. was travelling in despere,tion from. toqui to toqui, trying to 
salvage the accomplishments achieved prior to this outburst; under these 
most difficult circumstances it seemed quite ilnposdble to convey the though 
that he still held his official capacity and that regru'dless of contrary de-
rr~onstrations of the governor, the king desired the ple.n of "guerra defensiva 
to be effective. 40 Resentful of the authority possessed by Valdivia which, 
though little r~lspe cted, was still official, Govornor Ribera wrote to 
Felipe III requesting a limitation of the jurisdiction of the padre. 41 
Leaving the are;umentation in the hands of tbe fewer tmd perhaps more sincere 
opposers of' Valdivie" the soldiers and encomenderos were not slow to reap" 
the profit they had feared to lose during the first months of the actual 
"guerra def'ensiva." Velc1ivi9., Torres, the SO(1iety itself, were drenched in 
the torrent of' public anim.osity in reward for endeavors to abolish personal 
service. Such murders as the martyrdoms should not be allowed to remain 
unavenged, was the cry of the opposition, or else ruination of all the 
38Ibid., II, 593. 
39Ibid., II, 593. 
40Ibid., II, 616. 
4lAstrain, IV, 721, 724. 
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Spsniards in Chile woulc. ensue. 4 2 The ayuntemiEntos of Santie.go and of 
C0Pcepcifn sent joint memorials to the king voicing COIfilllon indignation 
towp.rds the entire plan fostered by the padre. 43 
While ample discussion has been devote<4 ~ the more pragmatically 
motivated group in opposition to Valdivia, there was another minority group 
fftr more sincere in their protestations. The majority of DorninicfAns, 
Franciscans and Augustir:ians md been persuade~ by the testimony of the 
soldiers who, having engaged in combat with the fierce Araucania,ns, had 
concluded that men of so savage a nature could only be subdued by armed 
force. To represent them in their protestations 8.gainst It guerra defensi va" 
with its cons8!juent ban upou personal service .. the cabildos of La Serena, 
Santiago, and Concepcibn appointed the guardie.n of tho convent of San 
Francisco, Fray, Pedro de Sosa, to convey their case to Felipe 111.44 Fray 
Pedro recently had been devoting :tis sermons to frantic denunciations of 
Valdivia's activities, intermingling personal e,ccusations aga.inst the padre--
al thoue;l: he was unable to substantiate such libelous statements. 45 So seri-
ous had his accusetions become that the oidores found it necessary to ban 
such discussions being giVC1: from the pulpit. 46 
As the notable and intelligent I<ray Pedro waG sent by the cabildos with 
the sanction of Ribers, Colonel Pec.ro Cort(s wa.s similarly chareed by the 
42Evon Villabos, who vms not incl ined to support Padre Valdi vie.' s ple.n, be-
moaned the unnecessary slaughter which followed the me.rtyrdoms. Espec-
ially did he condemn the suffering inflicted upon thOSE natives fa.ithful 
to the precepts of the Church and the rules of the king. Under such con-
ditions the author opined that the war "dure.r!:L siemprc." Grandeza.s de 
D.!dias ~ §..stedo Eclesie.st;j co Politic0..:t. Militar de America, in ColecciOn 
Historiadores~ XXIX, 21-22. 
43Astrain, IV, 724. 
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Ilrmy men to reprCsE;nt their grievances against "guerra defensiva".47 The 
two embarked for Spain in April. 1613. Following suit. Valc.ivia dispatched 
Eelchor Venegas to defend rtis case in Peru, and to Madrid he sent his cbss 
companion Gaspar Sobr:Lo. Both were amply ;jfj~'plied with letters and 
nlemorials refuting all possible aC:-lusaticns. 
While Valdivia vms vainly attemptinr; to drive back the tidal wave of 
,. 
vieaforls streaming under Ribera's orders, a wer of' words was waged in Peru 
d S . 48 an . p!l.ln. _. For two yee.rs. from 1614 to le16. attacks and counter attacks 
were dealt~ in su ch I'J.tundance that to a.ttempt a chronolog;ical description 
would prove hopelessly befuddling. It seems best, to indicate only the pri-
ma.ry premises involved in the Fray Sosa-Pedro Cortes VB. Gaspa.r Sobrino 
cese. 49 
Cort{s sur.unarized his argumen"'.:s in a. memorial in which he accounted for 
all Chile's existing difficulties by the eight month experiment of "guerra 
defensiva."50 Eis accusa.tion appeared pathetioally illogioal when Chile had 
been suffering ac('!utely for ever seventy years while" guerra offensiva" was 
the sole policy. He ennumer8.ted an impressive list of damages inflicted by 
44Actes del Cabilco de Santiago, in Colecdon Eistoriadores, XXIV, 387-388; 
400, 412. . 
4~~jedina, Biblioteca Eispano-Chilena, II, 155. 
46Astrain. IV, 723. 
47AmunCi"tegui Soler, Las Encorniendas. I. 384. 
4~~ile Ribera was i~icting all possible ravages upon the natives in re-
teliation for the slaying of the padres. Padre Valdivia. had sent messages 
throughout the land assuring the Indians that peace was still his policy. 
He even sent a message to Anganamon offering him pardon for his offense; 
but the toqui suspected such leniency and only replied that when he had 
attempted to trent he had merely lost his wives and dnuEhters. Rose.1es. 
II, 596. 
4~:Medina, Biblioteca Eispano-Chilenc., II. 123-208. 
50ibid., II, 123-126. 
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th'3 natives from U.e time of the slaying of Governor Loyola to the Jesuit 
martyrdoms of 1612. In order to prevent all further damage he requested 
3000 armed men, 1000 arquesbuses, 1000 musketeers, 500 vizcainas, 1000 
rZG.dones e.nd 1300 infantry. 5l. This exhorbi ~ilf demand illustrates, 
pp,re,doxically enough, an excellent argument in behalf of "guerra defensiva.." 
Furthe r he opined tlop, t the nati vas were not decidedly dissatisfied with thei 
lot but were afflioted with a tendency to revott unreasonably.52 He added 
that it was quite impossible to rete.in the respect of tr.e soldhr or the 
native under humiliating leniency required in "guerra defensiva." 
Far more difficult to hurdle th.l.n the simple statement of Pedro Cori!es 
was the well organized argunent presented by Fray Pedro de Sosa. Sosa 
declared defensive warfare to be not only ineffectual, but th.l.t its executmn 
placed the Spaniards in actual danger by defensive action which invited the 
invasion of the Araucanians. To protect tr.emselves a3 well as the Christian 
ized natives, it was essential to continue consistently a military move 
wouthward tr.rough Arauce.nian territory; unless this were the practice the 
Araucanie.ns woule. take the initiative of perennial attaoks northward through 
Spanish le.nda. 53 Ee scoffed at the possibility of attaining a. static 
posi ti on with the Bfo-B!o as a common divisor. So sa failed to comprehend th 
plausibility of banning persona 1 servi ce. No tribute had been paid by those 
. 
Indians who had been freed from bondage; the Indie.ns could onlyadequa.tely 
sa.tisfy their ob1ige.tion of tribute to the cro,m by paying such persona.l 
51Ibid., II, 125. 
52Ibid., 11, 126. 
53Ibid.~ II, 160. 
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service. 54 He was disinclined to inconvenience the encomenderos~ whom he 
hailed as preservors of the peace and bulwarks of society, by forcing them 
to suffer the consequenoes of such an abolition. 55 
Ilis j udgraent upon the innate ne.ture of .U,if natives was unchangeable in 
its concept tr..a t they were violant~ fickle save.gas. This conviction formed 
the foundation of his argument that should the Araucanians be given such 
freedom as fostered by Padre Vale.ivie they woutd. abuse the liberty by re-
verting to their savage pattern of life, menacing the Spaniards and repell-
ing all development of civilization and conversion in Chile. 56 Only through 
personal service could the Indian be taught obedienoe to the kingdom of 
Spain and fidelity to the Faith. 57 He attributed the rebellion of the 
Indians not to the abusive treatment of the Spaniards, but to this stormy 
streak of savv.gry in the natives. 58 When the sword had out away these evil 
characteristios, then would the path be olear for the cross. 59 Deploring 
, ... 
the native inunorality even among those who were alreedy pe.dfied and under 
rigid supervis ion, he saw no hope of instilling Christian ideals unless they 
were subjected to severe discipline. 60 Foousing attention upon the failures 
of the Franciscans and the Mercedarians among the na ti ves, he was extremely 
skeptical that another order could aocomplish what these zealous friars 
failed to do. 61 To disprove a cle.im of accomplishment he too utilized. what 
54Ibid •• II, 170. 
55Ibid •• II, 171. 
56Ibid. , II, 171 
5'lndd. , II, 172. 
58I bic3 • , II, 178-189. 
59Ibid. , Il, 192. 
6orbid. , 11, 133. 
61Ibid 36 
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y:f>S becoming the classic instance for all those disapproving" guerra 
defensive.", namely, the martyrdoms of the Jesuits at the hands of Anganamon~ 
l~e suggested tre t these Indians who ha,d been forced to the more mountainous 
regions due to the war be taken under the pr~\~ctive scabbord of the 
Spaniards for which defense they should pay only personal service in 
rep~rtimientos divided among the Spaniards. 63 To rid the land of the more 
bellicose Indians he favored their deportation·perpetually to Feru. 64 He 
didn't offer any helpful hints as to how these elusive aborigines were to 
be oaptured in order to deport them, however; he simply expressed the opinu, 
that such a transplantation would effect a speedier submission of those who 
remained in Chile. Thus, stripped of all oratorioal or rhetorical foroe, 
were the arguments of the opposition. 65 
In defense of the offioial though much transgressed policy of "guerra 
defensiva," Sobrino stated tr~t according to Christian ethics it was the 
only desireable or permissable method of pacification. lIe refused to admi~ 
that the mee,ns of sle.very and the sword, though during many years both had 
proven ineffecti va in atte.ining spiritual or tempore,l gain, could justify 
the end of peace. Aside from the religious implicf:ltions, he recalled that 
Valdivia, through his methods" established peace in t:re hitherto rebellious 
62Ibid., 137-138. 
63IbId." II" 192. 
64Ibid., II, 193. 
65Ibid." II, 140-154. 
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removed, whereas Sobrino ha.d livE::d among these tribes, depended upon them 
as guides and friends, and travelled far into their lands with Valdivia 
who possessed a richer fund of direct knowledge concerning the AreUCltnie.ns 
than any or all of his opponents oombined. ;,. '47 
Impressed by the logic of Sobrino, the Council of Indies anG the king 
found no sufficient motive to discontinue "guarr!:-. dfJfensivc..". Thus on 
:~ov0m1er 21, 1615. Felipe III issued !c. csdu19 ~irecting the continuance of 
the policy. 66 Following this ceduls, January 3, 1616, he sent a letter 
voicing his approvf)l of Valdivia's efforts. 67 On paper iJnldivia had won 
his point. Yet Chile was 9. goocly distance froLl tre king end Spain; the 
rCY81 ctSdulas and senctions were disregarded. 
66Astrain, V. 627. 
67Enrich, I. 317. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUCCESS AIm DEFEAT 
... ., 
As has been indicated, the Jesuit martyrs found a vociferous, 
was 
suspiciously eager avenger in every soldier who suddenly/shaken by a 
sworn duty to revenge the deed by the subjug.:tion or slaying of each 
guilty or innocent native. Preparedness for an Indian attack meant an 
aggressive military entrada upon the Indians. E'or example, Captain BIas 
cI Perez de Esquilbias, with seventy soldiers, arrived at Concepcion to re-
enforce the city. The enemy had made no attack upon Concepci~n. There-
fore he sent fifty cavalrymen to the enemy at Cayreguano; from the re-
ductions of the friendly enemies his soldiers carried all they could dis-
1 
cover by looting. Other attacks with or without provocation of the 
natives were indiscriminately inflicted. Hhils Valdivia sent messages 
from Nacimiento urging peace with the Indians involved in rebellion, other 
2 
attacks or entradas were encouraged by the governor. Padre Valdivia was 
helpless in preventing the unofficial resumption of offensive hostilities. 
The governor had substituted Geronimo de Pedraza in the command 
of maestre de campo Pedro cort{s, charging him also with the estado of 
Arauco since Albaro IiuhoZ had requested to retire. Similarly he sur-
rounded himself with men of his selection who would comply with his 
1 Rosales, II, 605. 
" ~Ibid., II, 607. 
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orders in other posts of authority. Again such attacks upon the natives 
added nothing to the Spanish record other than debts. Regardless of the 
injustices they received, many natives who had been reduced by Valdivia 
.... ., 
and his companions retained an allegiance to the Spaniards to the extent 
of engaging in battles against rebellious Indian tribes. Such was the 
case when Tureulipe, with a quadrilla of In~ians from Puren, attacked 
the reduction of Neculguenu. A battle resulted in which even Indian 
women and children united against the toqui in order to verify their 
disapproval of Tureulipe's absolute refusal to tolerate any semblance of 
4 
peace with the Spaniards. The allegiance of the pacified Indian, how-
ever, could not balance the loss of trust of the borderline natives who 
had been verging upon a peaceful arrangment but who had violently re- . 
treated from the consideration upon witnessing the governor's retraction 
by action of the promises he had given verbally. 
Alonso de Ribera had contra.dicted the orders of the viceroy and 
the king by scoffing at the authority of Valdivia. He had made unfriendly 
excursions into enemy territory. He had prohibited Jesuits from entering 
the rebellious land, while he supervised further enslavement of the na-
5 
tives. In his infractions ,of the laws Ribera. was given the warm support 
of the majority of Chilean Spaniards. With far less success Valdivia 
3 
Ibid., II, 604-605. 
4Ibid ., II, 605-607. 
5Amunategui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 389. 
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combatted t=j the hostility of the Spanish opposition than that of the in-
fidel India:s_an. Nor did this indignation apply only to Valdivia personally, 
but the Soc:o-ciety was involved. Accusations aupersaturated with calumny 
;. .. ., 
were hurled f>,-d at the padres. Libel, regardless of public retractions, was 
6 
ever fallin!m ng upon ears anxious to believe. The interference of the 
society in H - behalf of the natives had struck.fear and anger in the hearts 
of the sold=b dier and the encomendero who cried that matters such as labor 
should remaisain in the hands of the military and civil authorities while 
7 
the padres 8 should concern themselves only with religious matters. The 
primary aim 00Ln of the Jesuits was to convert the natives. In order to ac-
complish thllrlhis objective it was evident that certain evils had to be re-
medied. Ths~e prime evil was the abuses inflicted upon the Indian by the 
soldier in ~ war and the encomendero on the hacienda. The Society could 
not condone E3 these abuses. Since the term personal service euphemistic 
expressed a ~ condition of servitude in its most despicable form, the 
padres soughrl~ht to segregate the natives from the Spaniards. Since the 
padres were e opposed to the system of personal service, they found them-
selves necesasssarily opposers of the encomenderos. 
In Ja~-anuary, 1617, Sobrino arrived in Lima, bearing dispatches of 
the king 8.ndD-.Ld Council which approved the continuance of "guerra defensiva". 
The recently~ y appointed viceroy, Principe de Esquilache, was, as had been 
his predeces essors, in accord with the instructions to carryon in the 
BEnrich, I,: 277-278. 
7Astrain, IV.~, 721-722. 
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8 
attempts to establish peace through this system. 
.' 
Sobrino departed from 
9 
Lima for Chile, where in March he delivered the dispatches to Valdivia. 
Among numerous complimentary notices, the king offered one mild admonish-
ment to the padre, suggesting that he endQe~r to effect through tact 
more harmonious relations with Ribera; this proved unnecessary since only 
10 
a few days previous, on March 9, Ribera had doffed his mortal garb. On 
.. 
the 15th of March Valdivia had written the information of Ribera's death 
11 
to the king. The governor, having died in Concepcion at the age of 
sixty, was reputed after his death to possess the virtues of prudence, 
affability, integrity, magnanimity, justice and mercifulness. The fact 
remains that during the last four years of his life Ribera had been the 
directing force behind the offensive war contrary to the commands of his 
superiors, displaying the characteristics so ascribed to him in surpris-
ingly few instances. 
Sobrino delivered other royal provisions. In essence these pro-
vided that: 1) the governor of Chile prosecute only defensive war; 2) Val 
divia alone should interpret the definition of defensive warfare; 3) the 
padres should pacify the Indians; 4) the governor should at all times 
comply with the regulations of Valdivia in regard to the natives; 5) as 
many religious as Valdivia judges necessary were to enter the Arauc~nian 
territory; 6) missions should be established wherever Valdivia deemed 
wisest; 7) the viceroy of Peru ~hould name a visitador general to inspect 
8Ibid., V, 628. 
9 Rosales, II, 622-625. 
10Medina, Biblioteca Hiapano-Chilena, I, 185-187. 
llAstrain V 629. -
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the adherence given these regulations in Chile; 8) Spanish soldiers and 
were to be banned from Araucanian territory; 3) all prisoners of war 
agreeing to abide by the principles of "guerra defensiva"should be re-
leased; 10) all prisoners captured in the.PUture should be held in cus-
12 
tody with the object of exchanging them for Spanish captives. The vice-
roy had appointed the fiscal of the audiencia of Lima, Fernando Machado, 
.. 
visitador to report the obedience given these co~nands. 
Following the death of Ribera, the licentiate Fernando Talaverano 
Gallegos, oidor of the royal audiencia of Santiago, was appointed governor 
Without delay he hastened to the frontier to review the situation. Dur-
ing ~fuy he inspected reductions, giving particular attention to the es-
tados of Arauco and YUJnbel where he connnunicated directly wi th numerous 
natives. Though formerly he displayed indications of a disapproval of 
"guerrll defensiva", he now evidenced his intention to give, without re-
servation, his full cooperation to Valdivia. With this attitude on the 
part of Talaverano, and subsequently on the part of his successor, Valdi-
via once again picked up the gnarled threads of his former achievements. 
~ith perseverance ballasted by hope he again sent messages throughout the 
lands announcing the resumption of cordiality of the new governor and re-
peating the often uttered desire for peace. To substantiate these ~es-
sages Valdivia declared free all those Indians who had been held in capti-
14 
vi ty during "RiberA '; s 'dar". He himself liberated thirty important na-
12Ibid., V, 638; Amun~tegui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 389-390. 
l3Astrain, V, 629; Rosales, II, 621. 
14Ibid., II, 619. 
13 
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15 
tives of Arauco who had been unjustly attacked. Concurrently, prisoners 
were freed from the fort of Lebo while visitador Machado liberated the 
16 
prisoners helrl in Concepci~n. 
Pelantarn carried Valdivia's messa~e~to the toquis of Puren, one 
they had heard before, but which had been counteracted by the assaults of 
Ribera. Jubilantly the padre received replies indicative of a willing-
• 17 
ness on the part of the natives to renew peace negotiations. Toquis 
from the cordilleras visited him at Nacimiento revealing that despite the 
unple&santness that had intervened, they still retained a confidence in 
18 
his kind of peaco. The recent Spanish raids resulted in a doubly 
strong insistence of these nativos upon the exclusion of all Spaniards, 
save the padres whom they requested, from their lands. 
Q,ui te naturally many failed to see where the "mercy" of the king 
lay when in reality they were recognized to possess land which they had 
proven could not be taken from them. On the frontier of Arauco and sim-
ilarly on that of Yumbel thousands of infidel Indians received the sacra-
ment of Baptism. Christian marriages were contracted. Instruction in 
the Faith was avidly sought. The zeal of the padres was bearing bounti-
19 
ful fruit. 
Twelve cacfques sought Valdivia in Santa Fe to deliver the message 
l5Ibid. , II, 
16Ibid. , II, 
l7Ibid., II, 
l8Ibid. , II, 
19Ibid • , II, 
625. 
625. 
627. 
628. Padre Valdivia remained in Nacimiento for several months 
629. 
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that in Puren and the neighboring territory the majority of toquis and 
natives, contrary to Tureulipe and Anganamon, were anxious to discuss 
20 
terms of peace with the padre. At a large council held on the site of 
Lleolleo, October 5, caciques and toquis :.oil? the provinces of Ayllareguas 
or Furen had reached the decision to secure peace based upon the sugges-
tions of Valdivia. Thus they had been sent not only as messengers but 
.. 
to act as plenipotentiaries who could negotiate a peace with Valdivia and 
the governor 'falaverano. 
Delighted with their message, Valdivia promised in the name of the 
king that there would be no transgression of the soldiers or civilians 
within their territory; reciprocally, they were to respect the Spanish 
21 
lands. To prevent possible difficulty and still permit a degree of 
commercial activity the natives were to limit their trade route to a 
certain path to Nacimiento and were to enter only when they possessed a 
22 
license issued by the captain of the fort. Further arrangements pro-
vided for the return of the wives and children of the Spaniards and an 
exchange of prisoners of war; a non-interference pact was agreed upon 
whereby neither Spaniard nor Indian was to interfere in the internal dis-
23 
agreements of the other. 
Valdivia was ever on the alert to improve conditions within ~he 
20Ibid ., II, 631-
2lIbid. , II, 632. 
22 Ibid., II, 633. 
23Ibid. , II, 633. 
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ranks of the natives. He organized a patrol of the finest Indian warriors 
to prevent the native highwaymen from entering Spanish land and to serve 
as a guard vvi thin their own borders. Especially serviceable were these 
24 
squads in Puren. The natives gave enthul .. ,si'£stic support to this innova-
tion. They had cooperated very little with the ers~Nhile toquis Anganamon 
and Tureulipe; now they were willing to organize to rid their territory of 
.. 25 
the harm wrought by these members of their tribe. Even the toquis of 
Pellagien where Anganamon had previously managed to solicit followers de-
nounced·him, following Pelantara instead in search of peace. They con-
suIted the padre to determine the most suitable punishment that should be 
pronounced against Anganamon who had rebelled not only against the Span-
24Ibid ., II, 633-634. 
25upon apprehending seven Indians who had come within Spanish territory 
to steal, an inquiry was held in which Padre Valdivia, the maestre de 
campo Alvaro Nunez de Pineda and Captain Alonso de Umana, who were in 
the fort of Nacimiento, investip::nted. The Indians said they had been 
among a group of fifty-eight who had come to steal horses, but that the 
others had rstreated. They said further that they had been sent by Anga-
namon who worked vl"ithout the knovdedFG or accord of the other toquis. They 
accounted for this change in Anganamon's stand from that of a toquis to 
that of a highwayman to the antagonism both he and Tureulipe bore tovrards 
Pelantara and the other toquis who desired peace. Unable to receive any 
cooperation against the Spaniards in Furen, these ~NO rebels turned to the 
toquis of Imperial and again were refused. They were able in all to re-
cruit only fifty-eight to carry out their threat to become foresteros. 
Ibid., II, 634-635. 
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iards but against all the toquis of the vicinity when they had expressed 
a desire for peace. Valdivia was far less harsh in his judgment than were 
Anganamon's former comp&nions. In a message sent with an Indian named 
Inaullanco whom he had freed from prison 1at\U whom the padre was aware 
could seek out Anganamon, he pardoned the toqui for all his misdeeds, 
citing in particular the murder of the Jesllits. Thus did he hope to 
convince Anganamon of the existence of the Christian virtue of charity. 
l~zed at such clemency, the other toquis viewed this act not as one of 
laxity in justice, but understood its sirnificance as a Christian s~nbol 
of forgiveness which they witnessed for the first time. Anganamon could 
not disband his fear of punisr~ent for his crime. He could not believe 
that this message was anything but a hoax in order to seize him for re-
taliation. 
In January, 1618, the viceroy chose as successor to Ribera, Don 
Lope de Ulloa y Lemos, a cabellero from Galicia noted for his adherence 
27 
to Christian principles. Arriving at ConcBpci~n January 14, 1618, the 
new f,overnor, accor,'lpanied by his servents and his wife, Dona Francisca 
de la Coba, hastened to the frontier to declar0 his intention of cooperat-
28 
ing with Valdivia as had Talaverano. Having banished apprehension on 
this score, he retired to Santiago to be received as president of the 
26 Ibid ., II, 636-637. 
27--/ 
PJllunategui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 393. 
28 
Rosales, II, 638. 
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audiencia. Returning to Concepcion he concentrated his attention upon 
the frontier problem, volunteering every assistance to Valdivia. Only 
once did the governor violate the agreement to refrain from trespassing 
upon Indian territory; in that instance it ~~ to punish ladrones led by 
30 
Tureulipe. Under the instructions of Valdivia the governor depopulated 
the fort of San Geronimo, retiring the company that had been established 
31 • 
there to Yumbel. He settled the torren of San Ignacio, congregating 
there Indians of Cayuguanu that they might be protected by Spanish arms. 
Defensive forts were established in Talcamavida while those along the 
cordillera frDm San Lupercia and Santa Elena were depopulated. Valdivia 
29The governor later received an admonition from the king because he had 
received the oidores without the formalities that, according to the custom 
of the day, were essential to the conduct of an official affair. Ibid., 
II, 639. ----
30During the rainy season at the beginning of the winter in 1618, when the 
~paniards were less vi~ilant, other ladrones entering the land of war 
travelled to the reduction of Colcura where they captured the cacique Cura 
pil and his family. When the kidnapping of this loyal friend of the .span-
iards was discovered, the ~overnor took up residence in a fort called San 
Bartolom~ de Ulloa at the foot of the hill of Villarran around which con-
gr9gated the Indians of Colcura so that all would be in preparedness 
should another such indignity be atte:npted. Other captains established 
themselves similarly in frontier forts. ~'ihen the ladrones entered the I 
friendly territory of Conilebo, near the fort of Negrete across the Bioeio 
carrying away twenty women and children and killing one native, Sergeant 
Mayor Gimenez de Lorca entered in pursuit with eight cavalrymen, reaching 
Paillaguen where he knew the leader of the ladrones, none other than Tur-
eulipe and the toqui Naguelpichon, would flee. Here a battle was fought 
in which the ladrones paid heavily for their attack. The Spaniards wi th-
drew immediately after their victory. Ibid., II, 639-640. 
31 Ibid ., II, 640. ----
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once more was rapidly achieving success, overcoming the enormous disad-
vantages caused by the devastation of the belligerency of Ribera. 
The new governor did not acquire any popularity in his efforts to 
comply with the instructions of the vicerD.if:'''' His atte;npt to enforce the 
substitution of tribute in lieu of personal service, so infuriated the 
encomenderos that in a letter dated ~:'ay 20, 1618, Ulloa wrote that he did 
,. 32 
not have eight friends in the entire territory of Chile. 
The cabildo of 3antiag~, composed mainly of encomenderos, resorted 
to active measures to renounce the abolition of personal service. On 
Spril 23, 1018, the licentiate Toro Mazote, the alcaldes ordinarios, and 
the procurador general of the city, Don Francisco Rodriguez de Manzano y 
Ovalle, approached the governor citing the cumbersome difficulties involve 
33 
in complying wi th such an aboli Uon. Unsuccessful in moving the governo 
by arguments that had been expounded and refuted since Valdivia first in-
traduced his system, the cabildo determined to report to the king the 
miserable failure of "guerra defensiva". After dispatching regidor Juan 
de Ulgalde to the frontier to substantiate their tales of failure, they 
were disappointed to learn of the notable progress that was being achieved 
34 
from Chillan to Concepci6n. They were forced to alter their mode of 
35 
attack. In the latter part of August a cabildo abierto was arrange~. 
32Barros Arana, Historia, IV, 138-139. 
33Actas de Cabildo de Santiago, Colecci&n Historiadores. L~V, 254-255, 281 
285, 289-,-290. 
34Amunategui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 396. 
35 
Ibid., I, 396; Astrain, V, 630. 
I 
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Indians ran the r,amut from dissatisfaction to bloody rebellion. Costly 
were such insurrections both in lives and cash. Therefore it seemed wiser 
to forego the attempt to profit by taxation of the natives, and be spared 
the expendi ture of warfare. Similarly wh1.,l'~ the war was rampant, com:'1erce 
could not thrive nor could Chilean industry. The regal coffers were far 
less important to the encornendero than his own personal and immediate fear 
of a possible disorganization of 1'.is h&clendt should he be forced to seek 
voluntary labor. Aware of the organized enmity of the cabildo of Santiago 
·"aU.i via. bluntly denounced its activities. The im:nedia te reaction to this 
was the charge that Valdivia was attempting to take Chile co~npletely under 
39 
control. 
Per;,aps the most crushb.g of all personal opposition to Padre Val-
divia was that of the members of his own Society. The opposition was 
directed towards the authoritative position retained by the padre in Chile 
which, they believed, involved him unnecessaril~r in the military and the'" 
politicnl aspects of administra~ion. Valdivia had no Jesuit superior in 
the Americas and, in the order, was accountable only to the Father General 
This lack of local Jesuit supervision over the padre caused him to suffer 
severe cri ticism. ?,~any padres of Peru, Paraguay and Chile were voicing 
their opinions that such exclusion from the usual system of subdele~ation 
40 
of authority was no longer essential •. Valdivia, ceaseless in his acti-
39 I. -'- d 1 C b· 1..1 d ., t· ·C 1 . / d [..'. -'- . d ~c~as e a 1 ~o e 0an lego, a GCC10n e ~lSvorla ores, 
Medina, Bib~ioteca. hISpuno-Chilena, II, 220-.-
xxv , 356-357; 
40Astrain, V, 630-631. 
; 
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4' 
vi ties on behalf of the Arauc ()canians, had accumulated a harvest of animosi-
tv amonR the 3paniards of Chi tile. Tho1J.gh he had labored splendidly blaz-
" ~ 
ing a spiritual path among thdhe natives, his 'Nork coule be carried on by 
other zealous Black Itobes. A Nit this jLlllctll!"8? Valdivia I s very presence in 
Chile was though~ by some Jes-eauits to serve only as further aggravation of 
the 3panie.rds towards the Soc:ociety. Among thos y,ho saw no necessity of 
.. 
suet jurisdiction as \ialdivie. ,::!S. p03sessed vms the successor (If Lqu~viva in 
41 
the f,cneralnte, ~utius \~i tell.D.eschi. In a letter ~ated Lpr~l 30, 1619, 
Vitelleschi placed Valclivia ulllLlnder the supervision of the provincial of 
42 
Par&p:uay. In the conferencecces and difficulties ar~sing over this teeh-
nicr.lity Valdiilia was bound b~cby the vow of obedience to abide by the de-
oision of his superior. 
In f .. arch, 1619, Valc:iv::wia pro-pos6d to ,'1'0 to Spain in order to repor·t 
r.is p'ot~ress to the- king. He es was refused permission by Vi telleschi to 
43 
m!?,kc thi s voyage. 
Again it has been necA8~ssBry to describe concurrent events in order 
to rresent a complete [icture.ee. ,ihile isolatec for the purpose of clr.rifi-
ca"~ion they must be correlateo:;ed to understand the situation. At the mo-
fuent Valdivia ~~s enjoying inoncreased success smong the natives in their 
own terri tory. The b(o-bG booorder was respected by the I!,overnor. TJ~)oa. 
4l Ib ' d V, 631. 1 ., 
4~-
G1bid • , V. 636-,3637. 
43~ V • 637. ..::2.5:.. , 
I 
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It wa s north of the Ero-D(o that "gusrre. de.fensi ,\'8" Vias defes. tee. The 
abolition of personal service - one of the primary requisites of the sy-
s+~err! - vras i~peded a 7.; every turn by the encomenderos and the soldiers. 
As long as slavery 01' the native was cont~tred, there would be lack of 
spiri.tual cevelo,ment anlong those enslaved. Attempts of the soldiers to 
further corral the human cattle through unfriendly and unofficial entradas ,. 
was a constant 6.f';gravation to the natives. Efforts to segregate the In-
dians from Spanish exploitation even brourht upon the Jesuits the aCCUSB-
tion that they were merely trying to dissemble their otm attempts at ex-
elusive exploitation of the natives. Perhaps the presence of Valdivia -
B personage so militantly associated with the defense of the natives 
through his labors among them and his well-publicised crusades in their 
behalf - served as additional fuel to the fire of antirathy that was 
being kindled towards the Jesuits. 5elieving this to be true, a growing 
number of pacres thought it wisest to transfer the reins of control to 
less obtrusive hands in order to banish unnecessary aggravation. To 
resolve all these elements into their untoppy climax, Valdivia was con-
fronted with another snemy hE: had battled before - his own discouragement. 
Lfter unpleasant 6nco~nters with his superior, the provincial of Paraguay, 
.Pedro de Onate , Valdivia sail ed for Lima in November ctC 1619, never, to 
44 
return to Chile end his Araucaniens. 
44 Rosales, Eistorif General del Reino de Chile, II, 619. 
I 
.' 
CP..AP TER VI I 
THE AFTER1~ TH 
In a letter to the king wri tten hoverriber 3, 1619 , Valdivia excused 
his departure with the complaint that after his many yoars of labor among ,. 
the Indis,ns he had withstood tremendous opposition bitterly flavored with 
mendacious testimony against his character; now he could bear no further 
1 
insult. In Lima, 7:here he remained about fi va months, he poured out hi s 
grief to Padre Frf'as Herr&:'n, who soon afterwards became tl-.e Provincis,l of 
Peru, and to the viceroy, Pr(ncipe de Esquile.che. Both these friends 
2 
sympathetically harkened to hiG woe and strove to consolp him. 'lihUe in 
Peru VelC:ivie. committed /?, grievous act of insubordination by riving vent 
to his indignation in two letters written to the Frovincie,l , Jnate , in 
3 
which he reflected seriously upon the 2udgrnent of his superior. 
1 N:edina, Eiblioteca Hispano-Chilene, I, 187. 
2 Astrain, V, 640-641. 
3 Ibid., V, 696-704. In these lotters of April 20, 1620 and April 30, 1620 
Valdi vis referred to tte desire of the viceroy to have Idm return to Chile ; 
but that he would never return since he had been so grievously offended. 
Astrain brin~s out the fact that PadrE; Onate had undert!:,ken an investiga-
tion of Valci vie. due to the constant mutterin~s hurled against the padre. 
Such an investigation degencrf\ted into a third degree which the padre re-
sented. Onate was able to find no verification for the calumnious attc.cks 
but his attitude was still suspicious. Ibid., V, 637-639. With the final 
dramatic flourish one of the letters closed with a statement directed to 
the General, who the wri tor fel t certe ir. would receive the acrimonious 
~otes, requesting forgiveness of Onate's injustices. In these letters are 
the evidences of Va.ldivia's essential human imperfection. He had been 
accused and found guiltless of mwnerous more wanton frailties. These 
letters, howover, betray his tendency to leek humility. He had experience 
little restrictions for seven years in Chile where he had proved himself 
capable 8S prudent administrator. Still he should have accepted the super 
~. assi ned over him b his General without these rotestations. 

-101-
to O~te, Valdivia sought to rectify some portion of the insult by penning 
an apology to the Frovincial of Paraguay. Vitelleschi was extremely ~ra-
9 
tified at this voluntary disple.y of hunili ty. On October 31, 1622 he 
wrote to Valdvia to comfort him and assu.-~him that the charE:es and sub-
sequent investil"ations endured by him in no way impared his reputation 
. 10 
in the Society. Valdivia vms named prefect of studies at the college 
.. 
of 'VallE.dolid; he was received vd th great consideration by the provincial 
of Castile. For twenty years he conscientiously discharged his duties at 
Valladolid. 
Valdivia heard the official pronouncements of the failure of 
"~uerra defensiva". He knew of the continued sle.veholding and slave-
trading policy of the encomenderos and soldiers. He sew the triumph of 
the enemies of defensive as poosed to offensive Indian war in Chile. fiis 
death, November 5, 1642, closed the sequel of his existence; his departure 
from Chile twenty-three years previously closed the chapter of his life 
among the Araucanians. 
Upon his departure from Chile Valdivia had extracted the promise 
of Governor Ulloa y Lemos to continue his efforts to prosecute "guerra 
11 
defensiva". Nevertheless additional particlos were being created with 
12 
the consequent additional a11ot,iment of natives. Governor Ulloa y 
Lemos left no evidence of achievement in this regard when he ceesed mortal 
13 
pursuits in December, 1020. And the new governor, interno, Cristobal 
9 Ibid. , V, -Ef42. 
10 Ibid., V, 646; Domingo LmunAtegui y Solar, 
I-:ilTt"a"res y E:scritores, Santiaf:o, 1934, 33. 
11 Barros Arana, Historie., IV, 142; 
Rosales, II, 643-644. 13 Barros Arana 
Jesultas, Gobernantes, 
-----r-
12 ft~unategui Selar, Las 
Encomiendas, I, 405-408. 
IV 139 143. 
; 
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·' de la Cerda, an oidor of the Audiencia, lost no time in awarding a number 
14 
of partidos to those whom he deemed worthy corregidores. 
The Tasa de Esquilache was a typical failure. This plan to ban 
. 
obligatory service requiring in substituti~~?a monetary tribute was formu-
lated by the viceroy Pri'ncipe de Esquilache under the g,uidance of Father 
15 
Yn1divi&. It was submitted to U.e king l'tarch 28, 1620; on the 8th of 
.. 16 
December, 1622, it received royal recognition. The purpose of the Tasa 
was to free the natives of all expense that was necessary to mainte,in de-
fensive gcrrisons for their ovm protection. Like all other efforts to 
sever the bonds of Indian slavery, this also met with the impenetrable op-
17 
postion of the encomenderos. The octo~enarian successor of Ulloa y 
Lemos, Pedro Osores de Ulloa, had been delegated to represent the undesir-
able limitations of the Tasa to the Council and kinr,. Eased upon the lack 
of probable native cooperation, coupled with inevitablE discomfort or ruin 
ation of the interests of the encomenderos, the bulwark of society, the 
18 
arguments of Osores de Ulloa carried weight. He was in theoretical 
accord with the plan of Valoivia, though he was convinced of the impossi-
l4Actas del Cabildo de Santiago, Col ecci~n ~ Hi storiadores, XXV, 411-415, 
429. -
l5Medina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, I, 134-151. 
16 / Lmunatep:;ui Solar, Las Encomiendas, I, 411-425. 
l7Ibid ., I, 443-445. 
l8Uedina, Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena, I, 151-165; Amunategui Solar, I, 
430-434. 
I 
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in a developed sense of insecurity detrimental to colonial morale. The per 
iodic successes quickly countered by defeats took their toll on the spirit 
of the inhabitants and the soldiers who, regardless of their profiteering, 
were discouraged at the lack of accomplishm~rii. The predominanoe of the 
military uniform overshadowed that of the clerical garb or the civilian 
apparel; it is difficult to state when or if this predominance has subsided 
,.. 
Remunerative though the slave trade proved to the soldier, his sal-
ary was not always as satisfactory. The maintenanoe of the enormous stand-
ing army was an almost unbearable expsnse. Frequent delays in recompensing 
the mercenary military was certain to evidence itself in discontent, dis-
obedience, ~nd desertion. Equally alarming to the encomendero was the 
number of epidemics and the increasing number of deserters among his slaves 
Those eoonomic ills predicted by Padre Valdivia had attacked Chile with ful 
force. 
e 
Similarly did the spiritual or religious disadvantages for.,seen by 
the padre materialize. The padres did manage to segregate many of the 
natives by establishing their own haciendas where the natives worked bound 
by the servitude of love for the padres and the spirit of brotherhood es-
tablished by them. 
The animosity evidenced towards the Jesuits during Valdivia's ..cru-
sade for "gllerra defensiva" was not to decrease but rather was nourished 
to an inordinate state of obesity by the padres' progress among the natives 
This animosity was to become one of the factors influential in the expulsio 
of the Jesuits in 1767. 
24 Ibid., f; 458. 
24 
I 
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cal years. They clearly outline what Valdivia intended to do as well as his 
actual experiences. These are found under the titles: 
Copis"de vna carta del padre Luys de Valdiuia. para el tenor Conde de Lemos, 
~rBfrdente de Indias, January 4, l60? ~ ~ 
Relacio~de 10,qve svcedio en la jornada gve hizimos e1 fenor Prefidsnte 
Alonfo de Ribera Gournador defte Reyno, y yo defde Arauco a Paycaui, a coclunr 
laB pazes de lUicura, ultima regua de Tucapel y las de Pueren y la Imperial, 
December 24, 1612. • 
Relacion de 10 qye svcedio en el Reyno de Chile defRues 9 81 Padre Luys de 
Valdiuia, de la Compania de Iesvs entro en el con fus ocho comp~neros Sacerdc-
tes de la mifma Compaaia, December, 1612. 
Reikacion de la muerte de los padres escrita por 81 Padre Valdiuia a 24 de 
Diziambr''3 de mil syscientos y doze 8_1 nadre Provincial de Lima, Decmmber, 16 2. 
Tratado de la importA.cia del medio, gva el~virrey propone de cortar la guerr 
de Chile..1_'z hazerla solamente defenfi ue., Madrid, 1610 or 1611. 
Of interest whi 1.3 not of comparable value to t.his investigation are the 
sermons of Valdivia which he composed and committed to memory since he found 
them most effective in teaching the natives. These have been edited by lo~ 
Toribio Nedine, Luis de Valdivia, Nueve Sermones en Lengua de Chile, Santiag , 
Rodolfo R. Schuller has produced a c,"ork of interest in regard to the 
linguistic achievements of Valdivia: Discovery of a Fra~ent of the Printed I 
Copy of the Work on the Millcayac Language by Luis de Valdivia, Cambritge, 
Massachusetts, 1913. 
Certain collections of documents have served a purpose in this study. 
In the edition of Ricardo Beltr~n yRozpide, ed., Coleccion Acerca del Esta-
do que Dejaban las Cosas Generales del Reina, Madrid, 1921, I, a collection 
made in compliance with a royal order, are found the memorials of D. Franci-
/ / 
sco de Toledo, of the Marques de Salinas, of the Marques de Montesclaros, 
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cedulas and regulations issued by Spain in regard to her colonies. This 
work was begun during the final years of the reign of Charles V. 
Forming an essential and basic source of information is the compilation 
made by Diego Barras Arana, ed., Colecci~n d~ nistoriadores de Chile y Docu-
mentos Relativos a la Historia Nacional, Santiago, 1881-1923. A summary of 
this collection is difficult to make since each volume merits distinct 
• 
criticism. In general, however, it may be s~id that this COllection contains 
the most pertinent narratives of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as 
well as the proceedings of the cabildo of Santiago which have been compiled 
by Medina in his Coleccion de Docum6ntos Ineditos Para la Historia de Chile 
Desd6 61 Viaje de Magallanes Haste. la Batalla de Maipo (1518-1818), Santiago 
1888-1902, 30 volumes. This latter ,'1ork is put into the nalso read" class 
for excent for the occassional supplement"ltion it affords to the collection 
of Barros Arana, it is unnecessary. 
The following is an index to the Coleccion de Historiadores: 
VOlume I - The five letters of Pedro de Valdivia to ~Thperor Charles V and 
V 
the acts of the cabildo of Santiago from 1541 to 1558. It is interesting t( 
note that even in these first letters of Pedro de Valdivia are the fore-
shadowings of the futUre difficulties with the Araucanians. The acts of I 
the cabildo reveal the division of the natives on a wholesale scale. 
VOlume II - Historia de Gongora ~armolejo, Documentos (1536-15?5) 
This soldier, Alonso de Gongora Marmolejo, had witnessed the activities of 
the conquistadores from the time of Pedro de Valdivia to that of Rod~igo de 
Quiroga. The work deals with the military concerns though eyed extremely 
dispassionately, adhering to an account of facts rather than seeking liter-
ary appeal. Ericilla used this v'TOrk as a source, thou€,,h, as will be given 
further attention, ~ricilla added a touch of his imagin3tion. 
Historia de Cordoba y Figueroa (1492-1?1?) 
Again the mili tarycispect of Chilean development is stressed by the maestre 
de campo don Pedro de Cordoba y Figueroa, whose anceisters fought in the 
ranks of Pedro de Valdivia. The author tends to degenerate into the ora-
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tori cal when the historical is either unknown or disliked by him. 
Volume III - Cauti verio Feliz del;.}1aestre de Camp~ Jeneral Don Francisco Nu-
frez de Pineda l Bascunan l Hazon Individual de Las Guerras Delatadas del 
Reino de Chile 
The primary value of this work lies in the,. a-pili ty of the author to reduce 
his experienoe as a captive of the Araucanians to a study of the native i 
his o,vn environment. Taken a prisoner of '~r by the revolted natives in 
May, 1629, he was held in "happy capti vi ty" until the followtng November. 
Ploughing through what vras either intendec; to be literary style or philo-
sophical dissertation, a valuable byproduct ~ information is rendered. 
The author gives a detaileci description of the habits of the natives, of 
their organization, their reactions to the abuses of the Spaniards, sympa-
thizing with their attitude. 
Volume IV - Miguel de Olivares, S.J., Historia Militar. Civil y Sagrada de 
QlUl§., part 1. 
Oli vares, a nati ve of Chile, was engaged in mi ssi onary work in hi s own land 
His inate ability and his scholarly use of the materials ~vai1ab1e to him 
in the Jesuit archives have combined to produce a work which is an essentia 
reference in the history of Chile in the eighteenth century. 
L Luis Triba1dos de Toledo, !Lsta Jeneral de las Continuadas Guerras Dificil 
Conquista del Gran Heino, Provincias de Chile. 
Tbleco became the offioial chronicler upon the death of Herrera in 1625. He 
failed to achieve the historical eminence achieved by his nredeeessor. Tole 
do died in 1634 before he had completed more than a sketch of his assignmj* 
,;:wherein he gave attention to the early success of the Jesuit pacification 0 
the Chilean natives. Not until the eighteenth oentury was his manuscript 
brought to light; then it was through Don Juan Bautista Munoz, commissioned 
by Charles III to write a history of the New World, that the manuscript was 
discovered. 
Volume V - Suarez de Figueroa, Hechos de Don Garcia Hurtado de Uendoza, 
Cuarto Y:arques de Canete. 
This work is more of a treatiee in defense of every action of Don GarCia, 
written by a resident of Italy who felt Bound to defend the name and honor 
of the Mendozas. 
Francisoo Caro de Torres, Hechos de Don Alonso de Sotomayor. 
This is little more than a oalandar of battles. 
Santiago Tesillo, Guerras de Chile, Causas de su Duraoion y Medios para .§.U 
Fin. 
"Tb.iS work, W'ri tten towal'ds the middle of the seventeenth century, oovers a 
deoade beginning with 1629. Its interest rests largely upon its bllustra-
tion of the lack of progress attained by the Spaniards against the natives. 
I 
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GJ'olume VI - Don Pedro Marino de Lovera, Cronica del Reino de Chile. 
The soldier Lovera had witnessed the activities of conqu~8tadores from 
Mexico to Chile. His narrative deals largely with the military expedition 
of the sixteenth century. After his death the viceroy, Don Garcia Hurtado 
de l'!;endoza, interested in uti Ii zing the record of the soldi er, placed it 
in the hands of Bartolome de Escobar,S.J" •. , ·for amplification, not adverse 
.,. .. , 
to having his own governorship given eulogic consideration. The padre 
continued the work, not revising it in any way but merely adding to it 
some factual material and abundant verbal laurel v~eaths as requested. 
Voli'l11ll.e VII - Miguel de Olivares, S.J"., Ristori: de la Comp.m{a 
Chile. 
Olivares (see Volume IV) described the developr:tent of J"esuit 
1593 to 1736, making use of the sources so available to him. 
been used as a source by all writers on the period since his 
de J"esus en 
acti vi ty from 
This work hal! 
time. 
Volume VIII- Don Vicente Carvallo i Goyeneche, Descripcion Historica, Geogra-
fica de~ Reino de Chile. 
The author was eng'iged for a great part of his life in military service in 
the Spanish army. His first book treats the history of Chile from the en-
trance of the Spaniards to 1627. His appreciation of the work of the 
J"esuits among the Indiaaa is always apparent. An appreciable amount of re 
search sUbstantiates his narrative. 
Volume IX -
This is a continuation of volume JIII in which the author deals with the 
period from 16?7 to 1789. He was extremely incensed concerning the suppres 
sion of the J" suits.· 
Volume X -
Carvallo i Goyeneche's history is continued. This section of his work 
gives detailed descriptions of the various provinces as to the natural re-
sources and the 10cal tribes. 
J"oaquin de Villarreal, Informe R~cho al Rei Nuestro Senor don Fernando el 
VI sobre Contener i E§ducir a la D~bida Obedi3ncia los Indios del ReinQ 
Chile. 
This work seves as an epilogue to the many futile attempts at pacification 
by its intensification upon the "duties" which the natives did not t'esl)eet 
with regard to their service to the king. 
Don Cosme Bueno, Descripcion de las Provincias de los Obisnados de Santiago 
i Concepcion. 
The author, the official cosmografo mayor of the viceroyalty of Peru, wrote 
this cartographical sketch of the bisho-prics. 
I 
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Uolume XI - Sant~ago de Tesillo, Restaraucion del Estado de Arauco. 
This description depicts the revolt of 1629; it may be consid'3red a des-
cripPion of any of the numerous aftermaths of revolts in colonial Chile. 
Fray Juan de Jesus Maria, :Memorias del RElill.D de Chile i de don Francisco 
- + 4, Meneses. 
Here are only a fev; sketchy and almost worthless remarks concerning the 
conquest of Chile. 
Jose Basilio de Rojas, Apuntes Hasta el Ana 1672. 
Written at the request of the Court, this w~rk is c)recise in stating in 
summary the important events in Chile from the first attempt at conquest 
to 1672. 
Juan Ignacio Molina, 8.J., Com~endio de la Hist.oria Jeografica Natural i 
Qi!il del Reino de Chile. 
This diges+, of rrolina t S vlOrk is not' as satisfactory as the English trA.nsla 
tion made by William Haley and H. Boyd, London, 1909. 1;:olina was among th 
fathers expelled from Chile in 1767. Returning to Italy he wrote his work 
in Italian. While he used some orlginal manuscripts, a great deal of his 
narration is basee' upon Olivares. His ]llarticular motive in wi'i ting this 
book was to intensify upon the good accomplished by his Society and the in 
justice of the suppression. It was widely circulated throughout Europe. 
Volume XIII - Alonso de Ovalle, 8.J., Historica Relacion del Reino de Chile. 
Ovalle, born of a cpatain gener"l.l in Santiago, entered the Society in 1625, 
worked among the natives until 1640 when he was entrusted with the chargt 
of procurador of the prd>vince of Chile in Rome. Arriving in Nadrid in 
1642, shortly before the death of Valdivia whom he visited in Valladolid, 
he presented a brief relation to the king. It was this work that he ampli 
fied shortly afterwards during his stay at Rome. In writing this relation 
Ovalle depended too strongly upon his excellent but humanly imperfect mem-
ory. Thus it has errors in several trivial instances. While the purpose of I 
this work was to present the causes for general failure south of the Bio-
Bio, the Drime inportance of the work lies in the fact that it was the firs 
general history of Chile to be published up to 1646. 
Volume XIII 
This is a continuation of Volume XII. 
Volume XIV - Felipe Gomez de Vidaurre, S.J., Eistoria Geograf!.~a, NAtural y 
Civil del Re&no de Chile. 
Vidaurre, born of a presidio family, entered. the Society in 1751. For 
twelve y,gars he remained in Va.ldivia. The rese of his life he s-pent in Li 
mao His work is brief and. at best may be considered ohly a comoendium of 
the previous works of the Jesuits in relation to Chile. 
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Volume XV -
This second part of Vidaurre's work deals irtth the civil and military hist-
ory of Chile to the middle of the eighteenth century. 
Chile. 
This narrative is interesting to the investigation since its author, '3. con-
tempora:ty of Valdivia, was opposed to guerra defensivR on all scores. In 
these five relations he evidences all the characteristic arguments on be-
h~ If of offensi ve warfare. A Boldi '31' in Flalid'3rs, :"rance, fmC. Italy for 
over thtrty years, he fought finally against the Arl'lucanian. As first 
serg'3ant under Ribera he VJaS encourRged by him to record the military suc-
cesseR and the futility of :lacific :measures of subduing the natives. With 
the ensuing difficulties encountered by Ribera in 1614 his former sel!geant 
,·began~towrite:i:n Italy on behalf of guerra offensiva and personal service. 
Volumes :x:vJl_. t~ XXI - Aetas del Cabildo de Santi'lgo. 
XVII J9.nu·l,j'Y 1665- through December 1669 
XVIII January 1670- through December 1675 
XIX January 1810- through December 1814 
XX January 1681- through December 1684 
XXIV January 1607- through December 1613 
XXV January 1614- through December 1621 
XXVIII January l62;~- through December 1627 
XXXI to XLIV - Various Actas of the Cabildo 
Volume XXII- Don Jose Perez GarCia, Historia de Chile, Book I. 
The author, a military man who had. known forty years of active service, man 
ifests a marked. inaptitude as a historian though he made laudable efforts 
to utilize authorities such as Olivares, Ovalle, and Figueroa. The first 
book deals with the evolving of the cabildo of Santiago and ~nth the physi-
cal features of the Chilean provinces. The civil history is taken to the I 
governorship of Pedro de Villagra. 
Volume XXIII -
The second book of Don Jose Perez Garcia narrates the civil events from the 
rule of Pedro de Villagra through the rule of the governor interno Luis 
Munoz de Guzman. 
Volume XXVI- M4 guel de Olivares, S.J., Historia ~ilitar, Civil y Sagrada de 
Chile, Book II. (See Volume IV) 
Juan Ignacio Molina, S.J., Compendio de la Historiaa Civil del Reino de 
Chile, Book II. (See Volume XI) 
Volume XXVII- Capitan Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo y Valdez, Historia General 
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y Natural de 1as.Indias. 
The first official chronicler of the New World carried his history only 
through the journey of Amalgro. 
Agustin de Zarate, Historia del Descubrimiento y ConQui~ta de la Provincia 
del Peru, y de las Guerras y Cosas Senaladh~'en ella Acaecidos Hasta el 
Vencimiento de Gonzala Pizarro y sus Secucuases, qpe en ella se Rebelaron 
contre su Uajestad' 
Only the section dealing with the Ama1gro expedition is given here, touch-
ing upon the abuses of the Indians. 
Francisco Lopez de Gomara, Hispania Victrix. 
The first and second part of the general history of the Indies by the 
official chronicler mentions the journey of Amalgro. 
Volume XXIX - Relaciones de Chile Sacadas de los Antiguos Cronistas de Indias 
y Otros Autores 
Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Malucas,(fragmentar~) 
This sketch, printed for the first time in 1609 at 1fladrid, describes the 
voyage of Magellan to the strech which was named after him. 
Gabriel de Villalobos, Grandezas de Indias '9 Estado :~clesiastico, Politico 
y Militar de America. 
This work touches briefly upon the activities of Valdivia when it expresses 
vague disapproval. 
" ... ... Fray Gil Gonzl'l.lez Davila, Teatro Eclesiastico de la Primitiva Iglesia de 
las Indies Occidenta1es. 
Davila, a Dominican, published his work in the middle of the seventeenth 
century. The chapters included here bear upon the succession of bishops in 
Concepcion and Santiago from 1662 to 1655. 
Pedro Fernandez del Pulgar, Hiatoria del Origen de la Amtrica 0 Indias 
Occidentales. 
Written by the cronista of the Indies and the cononigo magistral of the 
Church of ValenCia, this treats mainly the military and naval aspects of 
the Spanish activities in sixteenth century Chile. 
Diego Fernandez, Primera y Secunda Parte de la Historia del Peru. 
This account is too vague to be guilty of inaccuracy. The section nrinted 
here neals with the expedition of Pedro de Valdivia. 
Inc~ Garcilaseo de la Vega, Primera Parte de los Comentarios Reales del 
Peru. 
n;;Bin is much material on the maltreatment of the Indians under Amalgro 
and Pedro de Valdivia. Ercia11a used this work as one of his sources. 
I 
-114-
Juan Diaz de la Calle, Noticias Sacras y Reales de las Indias Occidentales 
Book IX contains some valuable material dealing with the founding of the 
first cities in Chile. 
Fray Gil Gonzale7" memorials among which is Relaci~n de los Agravios que 
los Indios de Chile Padec.ep.. • 47 
These memoria.ls evidence the frenzy to which the fray aroused himself over 
the ill treatment of the Indians. 1.'fuile they savor a bit of the Las 
Casas style, they do indicate some actu~l wrongs. 
j[olume XLV - Los Holandeses en Chile. • 
A collection of extracts and sketches pertinent to the expedition of Hollard 
in Chile during 1642 and 1643 are containea in this volume. 
e,EaoNDARY SOURCLS 
In the criticism of each of the following secondary works little attempt 
will be made to evaluate the author in general, nor the work, except in re-
gard to its direct bearing upon the subject of investigation. 
Domingo Amunategui y Solar, Historia Social de Chile, ~antiago, 1932. 
The author has treated the same problem more fully in Las Encomiendas de 
Indijenas en Chile, Santiago, 1909 ( 2 volumes). His works are scholarly, 
indicating scrupulous insistenoe unon manuscript verification of each point 
of discussion. The various nroblems of the natives and the encomenderos,. 
the causes and results of their conflict, are treated from the arrival of 
the Spaniards to the early republican period. 
Domingo Amunategui y Solar, Jesu{tas, Governantes, Nilitares y Escritore~, 
Santiago, 1934. 
The first word of the title refers to Valdivia. The article dealing with 
the padre is nothing more than a thumb-nail sketch of the chapters found 
in Astrain. 
Antonio Astrain, S.J., Historia de la Compan!a de Jesus en 1a Asistencia de 
Espana, Madrid, 191:-1925, IV, V. 
This work has proven the most satisfactory bibliographical aid as weil as 
an excellent general account of the Jesuits during these years. The scope 
of this work is the labor of the JeEJui ts in the New lNorld from their arri-
val to 1757. 
Diego Barros Arana managed to amess an extraordinary amount of noteworthy 
historical literature during his seventy seven years of life, terminating 
in 190? His edition of Colecci6n de Historiadores he already been out-
lined. Volumes III, IV, and V of the sixteen volume work, Historia Jenera! 
I 
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de Chile, Santi~go, 1884-1902, have been helpful in their further compila-
tion of documents but in his conclusions regarding the study made in this 
paper he does not seem to face the facts illustrated in the documents. 
Barros Arana is ranked as one of Chile's outstanding historians. It is th 
opinion of this commentator that Ba:rros AlP~'S contribution does not lie 
in his writing of history, but in his compilation of documents which he 
has edited. 
Erase from the work of Francisco Enrich, S.J., Historia de la Comp~nfa de 
Jes~s en Chile, Barcelona, 1891, his apolo~tic and eu10getic passages 
and one has a work which merits praise and censuttng on the same score. 
Although Enrich has worked through the writings of his Jesuit forerunners 
and has consulted numerous manuscripts from the archives of Chile and 
Seville, he has left gaps in his narrative which, considering the wealth 
of opportunity he had to tap original sources, he might well have filled 
in. Thus he is praised for the collection of documents he has used and 
printed, and censured fbr those he might hHve, but did not, use. 
Cresente Err~zuriz, O.P., Historia de Chile Durante 10S Go'Vierno de Don 
Garcia de r',!endoza, 1557-1561, Santiago, 1914. 
____ ~--__ --, Hist6ria de Chile Durante los Govienno de Francisco de Vil1a-
grd, 1561-1563, Santiago, 1915. 
, 
____________ , Historia de Chile Durante los Govierno de Pedro de Vi11agra, 
1563-1565, Santiago, 1916. 
These three books9re extremely vRluable in their detailed description ot 
the social policy of the conqui stador governors, written by a reliable 
historian. 
______ --«-, Los Orijines de la Iglesia Chilena, 1530-1603, SantiAgo, 1873. 
Essential to this study is this wo:;:-l( on the sixteenth century Church in 
Chile. Arr,ple dOClHnentation and clarity of pr:sent.ation characterize the 
study. 
Alonso de Ercilla y Zuniga, ed. by Jos6 Toribio J.;ledina, La. Araucana, Santi-
ago, 1910-1918, five volumes. 
This may be fine poetry. It is not good history. This poem, of wh1ch the 
first part appeared in 1569 and the last edition was reprinted in 1577, 
was the result of tile author's personal experiences with the expedition of 
Don Garcia de ~'lendoz2 in Chile, a smatt.ering of reference work, and his 
own unlimited imagination. 
Tom~s Guevara, Historia de 2J~J.le: Chile Prehisp.~, Santi3go, 1925, two vol-
umes. 
No sounder or more scholarly work on the aborigine of Chile has been pub-
I 
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lished than these volu."n8s. It complements in many resnects the splendid 
composit "I.\Jl!rlcl{ of Jos~ Toribio :Medi~a, Los Aborigines de Chile, Santiago, 
188~~ • 
Diego de Rosales, S.J., Historia General d~l·,Jteino de Chile, Valparaiso, 
1878, three volumes. 
It is difficult to classify this work. The author, possessing remarkable 
discermnent, excellent first hand experience, and editing copious transcrip 
tions of docU!'!ents to which historians have been referring ever since the 
publication of the work,has presente a comiination primary-secondary 
history. Rosales was born in ~adrid at the opening of the seventeenth 
century. In 1629 he entered the Society and journeyed to Chile. A resi-
dent in Ar'1uco, he 8chipvec'l noi>1ble pror>linence 8.S a te8.cher, preacher, and 
counsellor. He accompanied both the governor JVlarques de Baides and the 
govennor Don ~~artin de Tliejeca on numorous expeditions into the Araucanian 
land. As rector of the college of Concepcion, sUJerior, and 'finally vice-
provincial of Chile, he reapec:. both spiritual and temDoral qchi evements. 
Not until the latter half of the seventeenth century did he begin his hist-
ory which aovers the l"'1ilitary, civil and ecclesiastical events from 1535 
to 1672, two years before his death. 
For biographical sketches and bibliographical aids, four works have 
been consulted: 
Ludwig Kock, S.J., Jesuiten Lexikon die Gesellschaft Jesu einst und Jetzt, 
Germany, 1934. ,-
Judging from a lini ted experi ence, this work 18.cks suffi cient accuracy to 
be depended upon. 
Jos~ Toribio Medina, Diccionario Biogra:fico Colonial de ChilJZ, Santiago, 1905 
three volumes. 
This biographical dictlonary is of incalcu~ble assisi,ance identifying every 
character of note throughout Chile from 1535 to 1818. 
Juan Eusebio Nieremberg, S.J., Varones Ilt1;s6res de 18 Compani'a de :tesus, 
Bilbao, 1889, IV. 
Interesting enough, while the martyrs Vechi and Aranda are given mention, 
Valdivia is evidently not an ilustre, for he is conspicuously absent. 
Carlos Sommervogel, S.J., Bibliote9.ue de la Co:mpagnie de Je~, Paris, 1908. 
This work is a giant in scope and scholarship. 
The thesis, "Padre Luis de Valdivia and the 
.. 
Arauoanians", written by Beatrioe Lorraine Blum, 
has been aooepted by the Graduate Sohool with re-
ferenoe to form, and by the readers whose names 
appear be1ow, with referenoe to oontent. It is, 
therefore, acoepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
.' 
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